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Observable implications of Nash and subgame-perfect behavior in extensive games

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Author Info
Susan Snyder
Indrajit Ray

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Abstract

We provide necessary and sufficient conditions for observed outcomes in extensive game forms, in which preferences are unobserved, to be rationalized first, partially, as a Nash equilibrium and then, fully, as the unique subgame-perfect equilibrium. Thus, one could use these conditions to find that play is (a) consistent with subgame-perfect equilibrium, or (b) not consistent with subgame-perfect equilibrium but is consistent with Nash equilibrium, or (c) consistent with neither.

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Paper provided by Econometric Society in its series Econometric Society 2004 North American Summer Meetings with number 407.

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Date of creation: 11 Aug 2004
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Handle: RePEc:ecm:nasm04:407

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Related research
Keywords: Revealed preference; subgame-perfect equilibrium;

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Bossert, W. & Sprumont, Y., 2000. "Core Retionalizability in Two-Agent Exchange Economies," Cahiers de recherche 2000-09, Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ.
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  2. Martin J. Osborne & Ariel Rubinstein, 1994. "A Course in Game Theory," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262650401, April.
  3. Bossert, W. & Sprumont, Y., 2001. "Non-Deteriorating Choice," Cahiers de recherche 2001-01, Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ.
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  4. Diewert, W. E. & Parkan, C., 1985. "Tests for the consistency of consumer data," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 30(1-2), pages 127-147. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Gil Kalai & Ariel Rubinstein & Ran Spiegler, 2002. "Rationalizing Choice Functions By Multiple Rationales," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 70(6), pages 2481-2488, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  6. Ray, Indrajit & Zhou, Lin, 2001. "Game Theory via Revealed Preferences," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 37(2), pages 415-424, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  7. Sen, Amartya K, 1971. "Choice Functions and Revealed Preference," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 38(115), pages 307-17, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Bossert, Walter & Sprumont, Yves, 2003. "Efficient and non-deteriorating choice," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 45(2), pages 131-142, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  9. Sprumont, Yves, 2001. "Paretian Quasi-orders: The Regular Two-Agent Case," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 101(2), pages 437-456, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Sprumont, Yves, 2000. "On the Testable Implications of Collective Choice Theories," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 93(2), pages 205-232, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Pierre-André Chiappori & Olivier Donni, 2006. "Learning from a Piece of Pie: The Empirical Content of Nash Bargaining," IZA Discussion Papers 2128, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). [Downloadable!]
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  2. Jose Penalva & Michael Ryall, 2008. "Empirical Implications of Information Structure in Finite Extensive Form Games," Contributions to Theoretical Economics, Berkeley Electronic Press, vol. 8(1), pages 1362-1362. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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