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Observable Implications of Nash and Subgame-Perfect Behavior in Extensive Games

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  • Indra Ray
  • Susan Snyder

Abstract

We provide necessary and sufficient conditions for observed outcomes in extensive game forms, in which preferences are unobserved, to be rationalized first, weakly, as a Nash equilibrium and then, fully, as the unique subgame-perfect equilibrium. Thus, one could use these conditions to find that play is (a) consistent with subgame-perfect equilibrium, or (b) not consistent with subgame-perfect behavior but is consistent with Nash equilibrium, or (c) consistent with neither.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Brown University, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 2003-02.

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Date of creation: 2003
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Handle: RePEc:bro:econwp:2003-02

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Postal: Department of Economics, Brown University, Providence, RI 02912

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  1. James Fenske & John Quah & Andres Carvajal, 2010. "Revealed Preference Tests of the Cournot Model," Economics Series Working Papers, University of Oxford, Department of Economics 506, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
  2. Bachmann, Ruediger, 2006. "Testable implications of coalitional rationality," Economics Letters, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 93(1), pages 101-105, October.
  3. Andrés Carvajal, 2010. "The testable implications of competitive equilibrium in economies with externalities," Economic Theory, Springer, Springer, vol. 45(1), pages 349-378, October.
  4. Ray, Indrajit & Zhou, Lin, 2001. "Game Theory via Revealed Preferences," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 37(2), pages 415-424, November.
  5. Walter Bossert & Yves Sprumont, 2013. "Every Choice Function Is Backwards‐Induction Rationalizable," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 81(6), pages 2521-2534, November.
  6. Carvajal, Andres & Ray, Indrajit & Snyder, Susan, 2004. "Equilibrium behavior in markets and games: testable restrictions and identification," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 40(1-2), pages 1-40, February.
  7. BOSSERT, Walter & SPRUMONT, Yves, 2000. "Core Retionalizability in Two-Agent Exchange Economies," Cahiers de recherche, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques 2000-09, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques.
  8. Sprumont, Yves, 2001. "Paretian Quasi-orders: The Regular Two-Agent Case," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 101(2), pages 437-456, December.
  9. Gil Kalai & Ariel Rubinstein & Ran Spiegler, 2001. "Rationalizing Choice Functions by Multiple Rationales," Discussion Paper Series, The Center for the Study of Rationality, Hebrew University, Jerusalem dp278, The Center for the Study of Rationality, Hebrew University, Jerusalem.
  10. Penalva Jose & Ryall Michael D, 2008. "Empirical Implications of Information Structure in Finite Extensive Form Games," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, De Gruyter, vol. 8(1), pages 1-49, January.
  11. Bossert, W. & Sprumont, Y., 2001. "Non-Deteriorating Choice," Cahiers de recherche, Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ 2001-01, Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ.
  12. Laurens Cherchye & Thomas Demuynck & Bram De Rock, 2013. "Nash‐Bargained Consumption Decisions: A Revealed Preference Analysis," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, Royal Economic Society, vol. 123, pages 195-235, 03.
  13. Lin Zhou, 2005. "The structure of the Nash equilibrium sets of standard 2-player games," Economic Theory, Springer, Springer, vol. 26(2), pages 301-308, 08.
  14. BOSSERT, Walter & SPRUMONT, Yves, 2002. "Efficient and Non-Deteriorating Choice," Cahiers de recherche, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques 2002-10, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques.
  15. Deb, Rahul, 2009. "A testable model of consumption with externalities," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 144(4), pages 1804-1816, July.
  16. Adam Galambos, 2005. "Revealed Preference in Game Theory," 2005 Meeting Papers, Society for Economic Dynamics 776, Society for Economic Dynamics.
  17. Demuynck, Thomas & Lauwers, Luc, 2009. "Nash rationalization of collective choice over lotteries," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 57(1), pages 1-15, January.
  18. Ruediger Bachmann, 2006. "Testable Implications of Pareto Efficiency and Individualrationality," Economic Theory, Springer, Springer, vol. 29(3), pages 489-504, November.
  19. Lee, SangMok, 2012. "The testable implications of zero-sum games," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 48(1), pages 39-46.
  20. Martin J. Osborne & Ariel Rubinstein, 1994. "A Course in Game Theory," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262650401, December.
  21. Sen, Amartya K, 1971. "Choice Functions and Revealed Preference," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 38(115), pages 307-17, July.
  22. Diewert, W. E. & Parkan, C., 1985. "Tests for the consistency of consumer data," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 30(1-2), pages 127-147.
  23. Sprumont, Yves, 2000. "On the Testable Implications of Collective Choice Theories," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 93(2), pages 205-232, August.
  24. Xu, Yongsheng & Zhou, Lin, 2007. "Rationalizability of choice functions by game trees," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 134(1), pages 548-556, May.
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Cited by:
  1. Walter Bossert & Yves Sprumont, 2013. "Every Choice Function Is Backwards‐Induction Rationalizable," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 81(6), pages 2521-2534, November.
  2. Lee, SangMok, 2012. "The testable implications of zero-sum games," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 48(1), pages 39-46.
  3. Chiappori, Pierre-André & Donni, Olivier, 2006. "Learning from a Piece of Pie: The Empirical Content of Nash Bargaining," IZA Discussion Papers 2128, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).

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