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Testable implications of coalitional rationality

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  • Bachmann, Ruediger

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  • Bachmann, Ruediger, 2006. "Testable implications of coalitional rationality," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 93(1), pages 101-105, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:93:y:2006:i:1:p:101-105
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    1. Chiappori, Pierre-Andre & Rochet, Jean-Charles, 1987. "Revealed Preferences and Differentiable Demand: Notes and Comments," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 55(3), pages 687-691, May.
    2. Bossert, Walter & Sprumont, Yves, 2003. "Efficient and non-deteriorating choice," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 45(2), pages 131-142, April.
    3. Walter Bossert & Yves Sprumont, 2002. "Core rationalizability in two-agent exchange economies," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 20(4), pages 777-791.
    4. Carvajal, Andres & Ray, Indrajit & Snyder, Susan, 2004. "Equilibrium behavior in markets and games: testable restrictions and identification," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 40(1-2), pages 1-40, February.
    5. Bachmann, Ruediger, 2004. "Rationalizing allocation data--a nonparametric Walrasian theory when prices are absent or non-Walrasian," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 40(3-4), pages 271-295, June.
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    Cited by:

    1. Ray, Indrajit & Snyder, Susan, 2013. "Observable implications of Nash and subgame-perfect behavior in extensive games," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 49(6), pages 471-477.
    2. Robert R. Routledge, 2009. "Testable implications of the Bertrand model," Economics Discussion Paper Series 0918, Economics, The University of Manchester.
    3. Ray, Indrajit & Snyder, Susan, 2013. "Observable implications of Nash and subgame-perfect behavior in extensive games," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 49(6), pages 471-477.
    4. Agatsuma, Yasushi, 2016. "Testable implications of the core in TU market games," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 64(C), pages 23-29.

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