Testable Implications of Pareto Efficiency and Individualrationality
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal Economic Theory.
Volume (Year): 29 (2006)
Issue (Month): 3 (November)
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Web page: http://link.springer.de/link/service/journals/00199/index.htm
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D50 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium - - - General
- D51 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium - - - Exchange and Production Economies
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