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Behind the scenes of the beauty contest: window dressing and the G-SIB framework

Author

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  • Behn, Markus
  • Mangiante, Giacomo
  • Parisi, Laura
  • Wedow, Michael

Abstract

This paper illustrates that systemically important banks reduce a range of activities at year-end, leading to lower additional capital requirements in the form of G-SIB buffers. The effects are stronger for banks with higher incentives to reduce the indicators, and for banks with balance sheet structures that can more easily be adjusted. The observed reduction in activity may imply an overall underestimation of banks' systemic importance as well as a distortion in their relative ranking, with implications for banks' ability to absorb losses. Moreover, a reduction in the provision of certain services at year-end may adversely affect overall market functioning. JEL Classification: G20, G21, G28

Suggested Citation

  • Behn, Markus & Mangiante, Giacomo & Parisi, Laura & Wedow, Michael, 2019. "Behind the scenes of the beauty contest: window dressing and the G-SIB framework," Working Paper Series 2298, European Central Bank.
    • Handle: RePEc:ecb:ecbwps:20192298
    Note: 2203070
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Cerutti, Eugenio M. & Obstfeld, Maurice & Zhou, Haonan, 2021. "Covered interest parity deviations: Macrofinancial determinants," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 130(C).
    2. Luis Garcia & Ulf Lewrick & Taja Sečnik, 2023. "Window Dressing and the Designation of Global Systemically Important Banks," Journal of Financial Services Research, Springer;Western Finance Association, vol. 64(2), pages 231-264, October.
    3. Faria-e-Castro, Miguel & Paul, Pascal & Sánchez, Juan M., 2024. "Evergreening," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 153(C).
      • Miguel Faria-e-Castro & Pascal Paul & Juan M. Sanchez, 2021. "Evergreening," Working Papers 2021-012, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, revised Aug 2023.
      • Miguel Faria-e-Castro & Pascal Paul & Juan M. Sanchez, 2022. "Evergreening," Working Paper Series 2022-14, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco.
    4. Shida, Jakob, 2023. "Primary market demand for German government bonds," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 137(C).
    5. Bassi, Claudio & Behn, Markus & Grill, Michael & Waibel, Martin, 2023. "Window dressing of regulatory metrics: evidence from repo markets," Working Paper Series 2771, European Central Bank.
    6. Busch, Pascal & Cappelletti, Giuseppe & Marincas, Vlad & Meller, Barbara & Wildmann, Nadya, 2021. "How useful is market information for the identification of G-SIBs?," Occasional Paper Series 260, European Central Bank.
    7. Behn, Markus & Schramm, Alexander, 2020. "The impact of G-SIB identification on bank lending: evidence from syndicated loans," Working Paper Series 2479, European Central Bank.
    8. Luis Garcia & Ulf Lewrick & Taja Sečnik, 2021. "Is window dressing by banks systemically important?," BIS Working Papers 960, Bank for International Settlements.
    9. Behn, Markus & Schramm, Alexander, 2021. "The impact of G-SIB identification on bank lending: Evidence from syndicated loans," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 57(C).
    10. Tirupam Goel & Ulf Lewrick & Aakriti Mathur, 2019. "Playing it safe: global systemically important banks after the crisis," BIS Quarterly Review, Bank for International Settlements, September.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    bank regulation; systemically important banks; window dressing;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G20 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - General
    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
    • G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation

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