The Manipulation of Basel Risk-Weights
AbstractIn this paper, we examine the relationship between banks’ approval for the internal ratings-based (IRB) approaches of Basel II and the ratio of risk-weighted over total assets. Analysing a panel of 115 banks from 21 OECD countries that were eventually approved for applying the IRB to their credit portfolio, we find that risk-weight density is lower once regulatory approval is granted. The effect persists when we control for different loan categories, and we provide evidence showing that it cannot be explained by flawed modelling, or improved risk-measurement alone. Consistent with theories of risk-weight manipulation, we find the decline in risk-weights to be particularly prevalent among weakly capitalised banks, when the legal framework for supervision is weak, and in countries where supervisors are overseeing many IRB banks. We conclude that part of the decline in reported riskiness under the IRB results from banks’ strategic risk-modelling.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers in its series CEPR Discussion Papers with number 9494.
Date of creation: May 2013
Date of revision:
Contact details of provider:
Postal: Centre for Economic Policy Research, 77 Bastwick Street, London EC1V 3PZ.
Phone: 44 - 20 - 7183 8801
Fax: 44 - 20 - 7183 8820
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- G20 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - General
- G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
- G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2013-09-26 (All new papers)
- NEP-BAN-2013-09-26 (Banking)
- NEP-CBA-2013-09-26 (Central Banking)
- NEP-RMG-2013-09-26 (Risk Management)
You can help add them by filling out this form.
CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Lukas Scheffknecht, 2013. "Contextualizing Systemic Risk," ROME Working Papers 201317, ROME Network.
- Horvath, B.L., 2013. "The impact of Taxation on Bank Leverage and Asset Risk," Discussion Paper 2013-076, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
- David G. Mayes & Hanno Stremmel, 2014.
"The Effectiveness of Capital Adequacy Measures in Predicting Bank Distress,"
Chapters in SUERF Studies,
SUERF - The European Money and Finance Forum.
- David G. Mayes & Hanno Stremmel, 2014. "The Effectiveness of Capital Adequacy Measures in Predicting Bank Distress," SUERF Studies, SUERF - The European Money and Finance Forum, number 2014/1.
- Harald Hau & Sam Langfield & David Marques-Ibanez, 2013.
"Bank ratings: what determines their quality?,"
CEPR & CES & MSH, vol. 28(74), pages 289-333, 04.
- Harald Hau & Sam Langfield & David Marques-Ibanez, 2012. "Bank ratings-What determines their quality?," Working Papers 12012, Bangor Business School, Prifysgol Bangor University (Cymru / Wales).
- Hau, Harald & Langfield, Sam & Marqués Ibañez, David, 2012. "Bank ratings: What determines their quality?," CEPR Discussion Papers 9171, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Hau, Harald & Langfield, Sam & Marqués-Ibáñez, David, 2012. "Bank ratings: what determines their quality?," Working Paper Series 1484, European Central Bank.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: ().
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.