AbstractWe extend the efficiency wage model of Shapiro and Stiglitz to account for the observation that workers’ effort has a tendency to fall when they approach the end of their employment contract. In particular, we find that the efficiency wage increases when the end of term approaches for a given rate of unemployment. We draw implications for the behavior of workers who are approaching retirement, temporary employment contracts, and the advance notice of impending job loss.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Economic Studies, University of Dundee in its series Dundee Discussion Papers in Economics with number 266.
Length: 13 pages
Date of creation: Jun 2012
Date of revision:
Wage setting; shirking; finite horizons;
Other versions of this item:
- J31 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Wage Level and Structure; Wage Differentials
- J21 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - Labor Force and Employment, Size, and Structure
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2012-08-23 (All new papers)
- NEP-LAB-2012-08-23 (Labour Economics)
- NEP-LMA-2012-08-23 (Labor Markets - Supply, Demand, & Wages)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Benoit Dostie, 2006.
"Wages, Productivity and Aging,"
Cahiers de recherche
06-15, HEC Montréal, Institut d'économie appliquée.
- Benoit Dostie, 2006. "Wages, Productivity and Aging," Cahiers de recherche 0645, CIRPEE.
- Dostie, Benoit, 2006. "Wages, Productivity and Aging," IZA Discussion Papers 2496, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
- Benoit Dostie, 2007. "Wages, Productivity and Aging," CIRANO Working Papers 2007s-02, CIRANO.
- Addison, John T & Chilton, John B, 1997. "Nondisclosure as a Contract Remedy: Explaining the Advance-Notice Puzzle," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 15(1), pages 143-64, January.
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