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La réglementation de l’audit est-elle dans l’intérêt public:quelques enseignements du modèle français

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Author Info

  • Charles Piot

    () (Université de Grenoble)

  • Alain Schatt

    () (Université de Bourgogne IAE LEG UMR Cnrs 5118)

Abstract

(VF)Cet article s’appuie sur les travaux académiques des dix dernières années pour évaluer les effets de la réglementation française visant à accroître l’indépendance des auditeurs. Pour les sociétés cotées en bourse, l’obligation de recourir à deux auditeurs se solde notamment par une moindre concentration du marché de l’audit : les Big Four détiennent une part de marché plus faible. Pour autant, les honoraires ne sont pas plus faibles, en raison vraisemblablement, d’une part, des coûts de coordination entre les deux auditeurs qui excèdent les bénéfices escomptés résultant d’un marché plus concurrentiel, d’autre part, de l’impossibilité de changer d’auditeur pendant la durée légale de six ans. Par ailleurs, la plus grande indépendance supposée, induite par cette réglementation spécifique, ne se traduit pas par une moindre gestion des résultats par les dirigeants français, malgré l’interdiction de facturer des honoraires de conseil. Ces constats empiriques nous conduisent à avancer que des assouplissements réglementaires du marché de l’audit pourraient s’avérer bénéfiques pour les actionnaires des entreprises françaises.(VA) This paper draws on the growing academic literature, over the last decade, to assess the effects of the French regulation aimed at promoting external auditor independence. For listed companies, the joint-audit requirement results in a less concentrated audit market: Big 4 auditors have a weaker market share as compared with other markets. But audit fees are not lower, however. This could be explained by (1) coordination costs between joint-auditors that outweigh the benefits of a more “open” market, and/or (2) the impossibility to switch auditor during a six-year legal engagement. Elsewhere, the a priori stronger independence associated with that specific regulation does not result in less earnings management activities by French managers, despite of the legal banning of parallel non-audit services. These empirical observations lead us to argue that a less constraining regulation of the audit market could benefit to the shareholders of French companies.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Université de Bourgogne - Leg (laboratoire d'économie et de gestion)/Fargo (Research center in Finance,organizational ARchitecture and GOvernance) in its series Working Papers FARGO with number 1100606.

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Length: 34 pages
Date of creation: Jun 2010
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:dij:wpfarg:1100606

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Web page: http://leg2.u-bourgogne.fr/

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Postal: Gérard Charreaux, Fargo-Leg, Université de Bourgogne 2 Bd Gabriel, BP 26611, 21066 Dijon Cedex, France

Related research

Keywords: audit; réglementation; France; honoraires; gestion des résultats; regulation; audit fees; earnings management.;

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References

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