Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

Impact of Mandatory IFRS Adoption on Conditional Conservatism in Europe

Contents:

Author Info

  • André, Paul

    ()
    (ESSEC Business School)

  • Filip, Andrei

    ()
    (ESSEC Business School)

  • Paugam, Luc

    ()
    (ESSEC Business School et Université Paris IX Dauphine)

Abstract

We study the effect of the mandatory adoption of IFRS in Europe in 2005 on conditional conservatism. To capture conditional conservatism, we use three measures: the Basu (1997) measure, the Khan and Watts (2009) measure, and a measure controlling for potential shifts in unconditional conservatism and cost of capital after the adoption of IFRS. From a sample of 7,251 firm-year observations drawn from 16 European countries, we document an overall decline of the degree of conditional conservatism across our three measures. While there is no change in weak enforcement/governance countries which remain less conditionally conservative than strong enforcement/governance countries, the latter exhibit a significant decrease. Further, we demonstrate that the decline is more significant for firms carrying intangible assets and goodwill in their balance sheets, items for which impairment tests rely on unverifiable fair value estimates. We argue that IFRS are conceptually conditionally conservative but that inappropriate application of conditional conservatism principles may have prevented financial reporting from reaching the level of conservatism targeted by the IASB.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://hal-essec.archives-ouvertes.fr/docs/00/86/26/83/PDF/WP1311.pdf
Download Restriction: no

Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by ESSEC Research Center, ESSEC Business School in its series ESSEC Working Papers with number WP1311.

as in new window
Length: 39 pages
Date of creation: Aug 2013
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:ebg:essewp:dr-13011

Note: M41, M48, G38
Contact details of provider:
Postal: ESSEC Research Center, BP 105, 95021 Cergy, France
Email:
Web page: http://www.essec.edu/
More information through EDIRC

Related research

Keywords: Conditional Conservatism; IFRS; Europe; Enforcement; Governance; Intangibles; Impairment;

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. Holger Daske & Luzi Hail & Christian Leuz & Rodrigo Verdi, 2008. "Mandatory IFRS Reporting around the World: Early Evidence on the Economic Consequences," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 46(5), pages 1085-1142, December.
  2. Robert W. Holthausen, 2009. "Accounting Standards, Financial Reporting Outcomes, and Enforcement," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 47(2), pages 447-458, 05.
  3. Ball, Ray & Kothari, S. P. & Robin, Ashok, 2000. "The effect of international institutional factors on properties of accounting earnings," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 29(1), pages 1-51, February.
  4. Ball, Ray & Shivakumar, Lakshmanan, 2005. "Earnings quality in UK private firms: comparative loss recognition timeliness," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 39(1), pages 83-128, February.
  5. DeFond, Mark & Hung, Mingyi & Trezevant, Robert, 2007. "Investor protection and the information content of annual earnings announcements: International evidence," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 43(1), pages 37-67, March.
  6. Durnev, Art & Kim, E. Han, 2004. "To Steal or Not to Steal: Firm Attributes, Legal Environment, and Valuation," CEI Working Paper Series 2004-7, Center for Economic Institutions, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University.
  7. Ulf Brüggemann & Jörg-Markus Hitz & Thorsten Sellhorn, 2012. "Intended and unintended consequences of mandatory IFRS adoption: A review of extant evidence and suggestions for future research," SFB 649 Discussion Papers SFB649DP2012-011, Sonderforschungsbereich 649, Humboldt University, Berlin, Germany.
  8. Pascal Dumontier & Bernard Raffournier, 2002. "Accounting and capital markets: a survey of the European evidence," European Accounting Review, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 11(1), pages 119-151.
  9. Roychowdhury, Sugata & Watts, Ross L., 2007. "Asymmetric timeliness of earnings, market-to-book and conservatism in financial reporting," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 44(1-2), pages 2-31, September.
  10. Ole-Kristian Hope, 2003. "Disclosure Practices, Enforcement of Accounting Standards, and Analysts' Forecast Accuracy: An International Study," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 41(2), pages 235-272, 05.
  11. Cristina Gaio, 2010. "The Relative Importance of Firm and Country Characteristics for Earnings Quality around the World," European Accounting Review, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 19(4), pages 693-738.
  12. S.P. Kothari & Karthik Ramanna & Douglas J. Skinner, 2009. "Implications for GAAP from an Analysis of Positive Research in Accounting," Harvard Business School Working Papers 09-137, Harvard Business School, revised Sep 2010.
  13. Ball, Ray & Robin, Ashok & Wu, Joanna Shuang, 2003. "Incentives versus standards: properties of accounting income in four East Asian countries," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 36(1-3), pages 235-270, December.
  14. David Easley & Soeren Hvidkjaer & Maureen O'Hara, 2002. "Is Information Risk a Determinant of Asset Returns?," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 57(5), pages 2185-2221, October.
  15. Stephen Ryan, 2006. "Identifying Conditional Conservatism," European Accounting Review, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 15(4), pages 511-525.
  16. Mary E. Barth & Wayne R. Landsman & Mark H. Lang, 2008. "International Accounting Standards and Accounting Quality," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 46(3), pages 467-498, 06.
  17. Dechow, Patricia & Ge, Weili & Schrand, Catherine, 2010. "Understanding earnings quality: A review of the proxies, their determinants and their consequences," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 50(2-3), pages 344-401, December.
  18. Juan Manuel Garcia Lara & Araceli Mora, 2004. "Balance sheet versus earnings conservatism in Europe," European Accounting Review, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 13(2), pages 261-292.
  19. Basu, Sudipta, 1997. "The conservatism principle and the asymmetric timeliness of earnings," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 24(1), pages 3-37, December.
  20. Annelies Renders & Ann Gaeremynck, 2007. "The Impact of Legal and Voluntary Investor Protection on the Early Adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS)," De Economist, Springer, vol. 155(1), pages 49-72, March.
  21. Andrei Filip, 2010. "IFRS and the value relevance of earnings: evidence from the emerging market of Romania," International Journal of Accounting, Auditing and Performance Evaluation, Inderscience Enterprises Ltd, vol. 6(2/3), pages 191-223.
  22. Robert M. Bushman & Joseph D. Piotroski & Abbie J. Smith, 2011. "Capital Allocation and Timely Accounting Recognition of Economic Losses," Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 38(1-2), pages 1-33, 01.
  23. Irene Karamanou & George P. Nishiotis, 2009. "Disclosure and the Cost of Capital: Evidence from the Market's Reaction to Firm Voluntary Adoption of IAS," Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 36(7-8), pages 793-821.
  24. Carolina Bona-Sanchez & Jeronimo Perez-Aleman & Domingo Javier Santana-Martin, 2011. "Ultimate Ownership and Earnings Conservatism," European Accounting Review, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 20(1), pages 57-80.
  25. Bushman, Robert M. & Piotroski, Joseph D., 2006. "Financial reporting incentives for conservative accounting: The influence of legal and political institutions," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 42(1-2), pages 107-148, October.
  26. Joachim Gassen & Rolf Uwe Fulbier & Thorsten Sellhorn, 2006. "International Differences in Conditional Conservatism - The Role of Unconditional Conservatism and Income Smoothing," European Accounting Review, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 15(4), pages 527-564.
  27. Christian Petersen & Thomas Plenborg, 2010. "How Do Firms Implement Impairment Tests of Goodwill?," Abacus, Accounting Foundation, University of Sydney, vol. 46(4), pages 419-446, December.
  28. Khan, Mozaffar & Watts, Ross L., 2009. "Estimation and empirical properties of a firm-year measure of accounting conservatism," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 48(2-3), pages 132-150, December.
  29. Sohyung Kim & Cheol Lee & Sung Wook Yoon, 2013. "Goodwill accounting and asymmetric timeliness of earnings," Review of Accounting and Finance, Emerald Group Publishing, vol. 12(2), pages 112-129, April.
  30. Ramanna, Karthik, 2008. "The implications of unverifiable fair-value accounting: Evidence from the political economy of goodwill accounting," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 45(2-3), pages 253-281, August.
  31. Ivana Raonic & Stuart McLeay & Ioannis Asimakopoulos, 2004. "The Timeliness of Income Recognition by European Companies: An Analysis of Institutional and Market Complexity," Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 31(1-2), pages 115-148.
  32. Leuz, Christian & Nanda, Dhananjay & Wysocki, Peter D., 2003. "Earnings management and investor protection: an international comparison," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 69(3), pages 505-527, September.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ebg:essewp:dr-13011. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Sophie Magnanou).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.