The Economic Determinants of Conditional Conservatism
AbstractWe study the economic determinants of conditional conservatism. Consistent with prior literature, we find that contracting induces only conditional conservatism and litigation induces both conditional and unconditional conservatism. We extend prior evidence by Qiang (2007) by showing that taxation and regulation induce not only unconditional conservatism, but conditional conservatism as well. We show that in certain scenarios taxation and regulation create incentives to shift income from periods with high taxation pressure and high public scrutiny to periods with lower taxation pressure and lower public scrutiny. These income shifting strategies are implemented by recognising current economic losses that, given managerial incentives to report aggressively, would not have been recognized otherwise, or by delaying the recognition of current economic gains that would have been recognized had circumstances been different. Copyright (c) 2009 The Authors Journal compilation (c) 2009 Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Wiley Blackwell in its journal Journal of Business Finance & Accounting.
Volume (Year): 36 (2009-04)
Issue (Month): 3-4 ()
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/journal.asp?ref=0306-686X
Other versions of this item:
- García Lara, Juan Manuel & García Osma, Beatriz & Penalva, Fernando, 2009. "The economic determinants of conditional conservatism," Open Access publications from Universidad Carlos III de Madrid info:hdl:10016/7423, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid.
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Rafael La Porta & Florencio Lopez-de-Silane & Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, 1996.
"Law and Finance,"
NBER Working Papers
5661, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Rafael LaPorta & Florencio Lopez de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, 1996. "Law and Finance," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 1768, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
- La Porta, Rafael & Lopez-de-Silanes, Florencio & Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert W., 1998. "Law and Finance," Scholarly Articles 3451310, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- Carel Huijgen & Martien Lubberink, 2005. "Earnings Conservatism, Litigation and Contracting: The Case of Cross-Listed Firms," Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 32(7-8), pages 1275-1309.
- K.J. Martijn Cremers & Vinay B. Nair, 2003. "Governance Mechanisms and Equity Prices," Yale School of Management Working Papers ysm376, Yale School of Management.
- Juan Manuel García Lara & Beatriz García Osma & Araceli Mora, 2005.
"The Effect of Earnings Management on the Asymmetric Timeliness of Earnings,"
Journal of Business Finance & Accounting,
Wiley Blackwell, vol. 32(3-4), pages 691-726.
- García Lara, Juan Manuel & García Osma, Beatriz & Mora, Araceli, 2005. "The effect of earnings management on the asymmetric timeliness of earnings," Open Access publications from Universidad Carlos III de Madrid info:hdl:10016/7633, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid.
- Juan Manuel Garcia Lara & Beatriz Garcia Osma & Fernando Penalva, 2007.
"Board of Directors' Characteristics and Conditional Accounting Conservatism: Spanish Evidence,"
European Accounting Review,
Taylor and Francis Journals, vol. 16(4), pages 727-755.
- García Lara, Juan Manuel & García Osma, Beatriz & Penalva, Fernando, 2007. "Board of directors' characteristics and conditional accounting conservatism : Spanish evidence," Open Access publications from Universidad Carlos III de Madrid info:hdl:10016/7425, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid.
- Mihir Desai & Dhammika Dharmapala, .
"Corporate Tax Avoidance and High Powered Incentives,"
American Law & Economics Association Annual Meetings
1006, American Law & Economics Association.
- Desai, Mihir A. & Dharmapala, Dhammika, 2006. "Corporate tax avoidance and high-powered incentives," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 79(1), pages 145-179, January.
- Mihir A. Desai & Dhammika Dharmapala, 2004. "Corporate Tax Avoidance and High Powered Incentives," Working papers 2004-09, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics.
- Mihir A. Desai & Dhammika Dharmapala, 2004. "Corporate Tax Avoidance and High Powered Incentives," NBER Working Papers 10471, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Myron S. Scholes & G. Peter Wilson & Mark A. Wolfson, 1992. "Firms' Responses to Anticipated Reductions in Tax Rates: The Tax Reform Act of 1986," NBER Working Papers 4171, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Joachim Gassen & Rolf Uwe Fulbier & Thorsten Sellhorn, 2006. "International Differences in Conditional Conservatism - The Role of Unconditional Conservatism and Income Smoothing," European Accounting Review, Taylor and Francis Journals, vol. 15(4), pages 527-564.
- Ivana Raonic & Stuart McLeay & Ioannis Asimakopoulos, 2004. "The Timeliness of Income Recognition by European Companies: An Analysis of Institutional and Market Complexity," Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 31(1-2), pages 115-148.
- Douglas A. Shackelford & Joel Slemrod & James M. Sallee, 2007. "A Unifying Model of How the Tax System and Generally Accepted Accounting Principles Affect Corporate Behavior," NBER Working Papers 12873, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Shackelford, Douglas A. & Shevlin, Terry, 2001. "Empirical tax research in accounting," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 31(1-3), pages 321-387, September.
- García Lara, Juan Manuel & García Osma, Beatriz & Penalva, Fernando, 2010. "Conditional conservatism and cost of capital," Open Access publications from Universidad Carlos III de Madrid info:hdl:10016/7422, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Wiley-Blackwell Digital Licensing) or (Christopher F. Baum).
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.