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Évolution institutionnelle, schémas mentaux et gouvernement des entreprises:le cas Krupp - Thyssen

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  • Peter Wirtz

    (Université de Bourgogne)

Abstract

Une comparaison rapide des contextes institutionnels de différents pays indique que le gouvernement des entreprises n'est pas indépendant de l'environnement national, dans lequel évolue la firme. En même temps, les systèmes de gouvernement des entreprises à l'intérieur d'un pays ne sont pas sta-tiques, mais subissent des changements au cours du temps. L'objectif du présent article est de proposer un cadre conceptuel, permettant d'expliquer les mécanismes du processus de changement des contraintes pesant sur l'espace discrétionnaire du dirigeant. L'étude d'un cas concret, à savoir le rapprochement de Krupp et Thyssen en Allemagne, nous sert à illustrer la plausibilité de nos hypothèses théoriques.

Suggested Citation

  • Peter Wirtz, 1999. "Évolution institutionnelle, schémas mentaux et gouvernement des entreprises:le cas Krupp - Thyssen," Working Papers CREGO 0990302, Université de Bourgogne - CREGO EA7317 Centre de recherches en gestion des organisations.
    • Handle: RePEc:dij:wpfarg:0990302
    Note: article publié dans Finance Contrôle Stratégie, vol.2, n°1, mars 1999, p.117-143.
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

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    2. Peter Wirtz, 2002. "Opportunism, Stewardship, and the Dynamics of Conflict in a Theory of Corporate Governance," Working Papers CREGO 1020101, Université de Bourgogne - CREGO EA7317 Centre de recherches en gestion des organisations.
    3. Christine Pochet, 2001. "Le gouvernement de l'entreprise défaillante: étude de trente plans de continuation," Revue Finance Contrôle Stratégie, revues.org, vol. 4(2), pages 149-181, March.
    4. Gérard Charreaux, 2002. "Variation sur le thème:"À la recherche de nouvelles fondations pour la finance et la gouvernance d'entreprise"," Revue Finance Contrôle Stratégie, revues.org, vol. 5(3), pages 5-68, September.
    5. Karima Dhaouadi, 2018. "Corporate Board and Upper Echelons: The Case of the American Most Admired Firms," International Journal of Business and Management, Canadian Center of Science and Education, vol. 13(4), pages 245-245, March.
    6. Didier Le Maitre, 2013. "Une Negation De L'Influence Des Theories Manageriales Sur Le Comportement A Partir D'Hirschman Et De Von Mises," Post-Print hal-00991951, HAL.
    7. Gérard Charreaux, 2001. "Quelle théorie pour la gouvernance?De la gouvernance actionnariale à la gouvernance cognitive..," Working Papers CREGO 010401, Université de Bourgogne - CREGO EA7317 Centre de recherches en gestion des organisations, revised Feb 2002.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    discrétion managériale; gouvernement des entreprises; schémas mentaux; politique financière.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G30 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - General
    • G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill

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