Corporate Ownership And Control In The U.K., Germany, And France
AbstractLike its U.S. counterpart, the U.K. corporate ownership and governance system can be characterized as an "outsider" system with a large number of public corporations, widely dispersed ownership (though with growing concentrations of institutional shareholdings), and well-developed takeover markets. By contrast, the much smaller number and proportion of publicly traded German and French corporations are governed by "insider" systems--those in which the founding families, banks, or other companies have controlling interests and in which outside shareholders are not able to exert much control. 1997 Morgan Stanley.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Morgan Stanley in its journal Journal of Applied Corporate Finance.
Volume (Year): 9 (1997)
Issue (Month): 4 ()
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