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Cooperative Game Solutions: Australian, Indian and U.S. Opinions

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Abstract

As part of several lectures the audience in Australia, India and the U.S. were asked how the gain from an agreed upon cooperation should be divided among three individuals. The responses are considered in the context of various cooperative solutions which have been suggested in the theory of games. More questions are raised than answered.

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  • Martin Shubik, 1979. "Cooperative Game Solutions: Australian, Indian and U.S. Opinions," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 517, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
    • Handle: RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:517
    Note: CFP 640.
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    1. SCHMEIDLER, David, 1969. "The nucleolus of a characteristic function game," LIDAM Reprints CORE 44, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
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    Cited by:

    1. Martin Shubik, 1988. "The Interaction of Implicit and Explicit Contracts in Repeated Agency," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 891, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
    2. Martin Shubik, 2002. "The Uses of Teaching Games in Game Theory Classes and Some Experimental Games," Simulation & Gaming, , vol. 33(2), pages 139-156, June.
    3. Martin Shubik, 1998. "Some Simple Games for Teaching and Research. Part 1: Cooperative Games," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1174, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.

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