Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

Competition between General Practitioners and Specialists in the Primary Health Care Market

Contents:

Author Info

  • Brasseur, Carine

    (UNIVERSITE CATHOLIQUE DE LOUVAIN, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES) ; Belgian National Fund for Scientific Research (FNRS))

Registered author(s):

    Abstract

    In this paper, we study the optimal payment system for the primary health care market when general practitioners are not only in competition between themselves but also with specialists. We define the copayment to impose in order to ensure a good allocation of patients among the two types of physicians. Further, we set the physician reimbursement system that guarantees an appropriate referral of patients to specialists. We prove that the GP's remuneration system is more prospective the larger the competition with specialists. Next, we show that the assumption of risk-averse patients precludes the optimal payment system from being a first-best solution. To conclude, we contrast the results of the analysis with systems of gatekeepers where all patients are required to go to a general practitioner before having access to specialized medicine.

    Download Info

    If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
    File URL: http://sites.uclouvain.be/econ/DP/IRES/2001-4.pdf
    Download Restriction: no

    Bibliographic Info

    Paper provided by Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES) in its series Discussion Papers (IRES - Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales) with number 2001004.

    as in new window
    Length: 23
    Date of creation: 01 Jan 2001
    Date of revision:
    Handle: RePEc:ctl:louvir:2001004

    Contact details of provider:
    Postal: Place Montesquieu 3, 1348 Louvain-la-Neuve (Belgium)
    Fax: +32 10473945
    Email:
    Web page: http://www.uclouvain.be/ires
    More information through EDIRC

    Related research

    Keywords: health care; competition; gatekeeping; payment system;

    Find related papers by JEL classification:

    References

    References listed on IDEAS
    Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
    as in new window
    1. Asher Wolinsky, 1991. "Competition in a Market for Informed Experts' Services," Discussion Papers, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science 959, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    2. Begoña García Mariñoso & Izabela Jelovac, 2000. "GPs’ Payment Contracts and their Referral Policy," Documentos de trabajo - Analise Economica, IDEGA - Instituto Universitario de Estudios e Desenvolvemento de Galicia 0010, IDEGA - Instituto Universitario de Estudios e Desenvolvemento de Galicia.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Lists

    This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ctl:louvir:2001004. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Anne DAVISTER-LOGIST).

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

    If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.