Competition between General Practitioners and Specialists in the Primary Health Care Market
AbstractIn this paper, we study the optimal payment system for the primary health care market when general practitioners are not only in competition between themselves but also with specialists. We define the copayment to impose in order to ensure a good allocation of patients among the two types of physicians. Further, we set the physician reimbursement system that guarantees an appropriate referral of patients to specialists. We prove that the GP's remuneration system is more prospective the larger the competition with specialists. Next, we show that the assumption of risk-averse patients precludes the optimal payment system from being a first-best solution. To conclude, we contrast the results of the analysis with systems of gatekeepers where all patients are required to go to a general practitioner before having access to specialized medicine.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES) in its series Discussion Papers (IRES - Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales) with number 2001004.
Date of creation: 01 Jan 2001
Date of revision:
health care; competition; gatekeeping; payment system;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- I10 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - General
- D60 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - General
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Asher Wolinsky, 1991.
"Competition in a Market for Informed Experts' Services,"
Discussion Papers, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science
959, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Asher Wolinsky, 1993. "Competition in a Market for Informed Experts' Services," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 24(3), pages 380-398, Autumn.
- Begoña García Mariñoso & Izabela Jelovac, 2000. "GPs’ Payment Contracts and their Referral Policy," Documentos de trabajo - Analise Economica, IDEGA - Instituto Universitario de Estudios e Desenvolvemento de Galicia 0010, IDEGA - Instituto Universitario de Estudios e Desenvolvemento de Galicia.
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