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The price of advice

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  • Péter Eső
  • Balázs Szentes

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  • Péter Eső & Balázs Szentes, 2007. "The price of advice," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 38(4), pages 863-880, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:randje:v:38:y:2007:i:4:p:863-880
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1111/j.0741-6261.2007.00116.x
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Pascal Courty & Li Hao, 2000. "Sequential Screening," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 67(4), pages 697-717.
    2. Mark Bagnoli & Ted Bergstrom, 2006. "Log-concave probability and its applications," Studies in Economic Theory, in: Charalambos D. Aliprantis & Rosa L. Matzkin & Daniel L. McFadden & James C. Moore & Nicholas C. Yann (ed.), Rationality and Equilibrium, pages 217-241, Springer.
    3. Baron, David P. & Besanko, David, 1984. "Regulation and information in a continuing relationship," Information Economics and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 1(3), pages 267-302.
    4. Péter Eso & Balázs Szentes, 2004. "The Price of Advice," Discussion Papers 1416, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    5. Maggi G. & Rodriguez-Clare A., 1995. "On Countervailing Incentives," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 66(1), pages 238-263, June.
    6. Paul Milgrom & John Roberts, 1986. "Relying on the Information of Interested Parties," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 17(1), pages 18-32, Spring.
    7. Jullien, Bruno, 2000. "Participation Constraints in Adverse Selection Models," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 93(1), pages 1-47, July.
    8. Dana, James D, Jr & Spier, Kathryn E, 1993. "Expertise and Contingent Fees: The Role of Asymmetric Information in Attorney Compensation," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 9(2), pages 349-367, October.
    9. Peter Klibanoff & Jonathan Morduch, 1995. "Decentralization, Externalities, and Efficiency," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 62(2), pages 223-247.
    10. Asher Wolinsky, 1993. "Competition in a Market for Informed Experts' Services," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 24(3), pages 380-398, Autumn.
    11. Riordan, Michael H & Sappington, David E M, 1987. "Awarding Monopoly Franchises," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 77(3), pages 375-387, June.
    12. Lewis, Tracy R. & Sappington, David E. M., 1989. "Countervailing incentives in agency problems," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 49(2), pages 294-313, December.
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    Cited by:

    1. Asseyer, Andreas, 2016. "Optimal Information Disclosure and Collusion," VfS Annual Conference 2016 (Augsburg): Demographic Change 145779, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    2. Zhu, Shuguang, 2023. "Private disclosure with multiple agents," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 212(C).
    3. Krähmer, Daniel & Strausz, Roland, 2017. "Sequential versus static screening: An equivalence result," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 106(C), pages 317-328.
    4. Holladay, Scott & LaRiviere, Jacob & Novgorodsky, David & Price, Michael, 2019. "Prices versus nudges: What matters for search versus purchase of energy investments?," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 172(C), pages 151-173.
    5. Yu, Pei Cheng, 2020. "Seemingly exploitative contracts," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 176(C), pages 299-320.
    6. Krähmer, Daniel & Strausz, Roland, 2015. "Ex post information rents in sequential screening," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 90(C), pages 257-273.
    7. Krähmer, Daniel, 2020. "Information disclosure and full surplus extraction in mechanism design," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 187(C).
    8. Zhang, Jun, 2013. "Revenue maximizing with return policy when buyers have uncertain valuations," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 31(5), pages 452-461.
    9. Krähmer, Daniel & Kováč, Eugen, 2016. "Optimal sequential delegation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 163(C), pages 849-888.
    10. Irene Valsecchi, 2013. "The expert problem: a survey," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 14(4), pages 303-331, November.
    11. Asseyer, Andreas, 2018. "Optimal monitoring in dynamic procurement contracts," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 59(C), pages 222-252.
    12. Chade, Hector & Kovrijnykh, Natalia, 2016. "Delegated information acquisition with moral hazard," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 162(C), pages 55-92.
    13. Andreas Asseyer, "undated". "Optimal monitoring in dynamic procurement contracts," BDPEMS Working Papers 2015002, Berlin School of Economics.
    14. Akan, Mustafa & Ata, Barış & Dana, James D., 2015. "Revenue management by sequential screening," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 159(PB), pages 728-774.

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