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Piracy and competition

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Author Info
Paul, BELLEFLAMME (UNIVERSITE CATHOLIQUE DE LOUVAIN, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE))
Pierre, PICARD

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Abstract

The effects of (private, small-scale) piracy on the pricing behavior of producers of information goods are studied within a unified model of vertical differentiation. Although information goods are assumed to be perfectly differentiated, demands are interdependent because the copying technology exhibits increasing returns to scale. We characterize the Bertrand-Nash equiliria in a duopoly. Comparing equilibrium prices to the prices set by a multiproduct monopolist, we show that competition drives prices up and may lead to price dispersion. Competition reduces total surplus in the short run but provides higher incentives to create in the long run.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Université catholique de Louvain, Département des Sciences Economiques in its series Discussion Papers (ECON - Département des Sciences Economiques) with number 2005057.

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Length: 39
Date of creation: 30 Sep 2005
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Handle: RePEc:ctl:louvec:2005057

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Related research
Keywords: Information goods; piracy; copyright; pricing;

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
L82 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Services - - - Entertainment; Media
L86 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Services - - - Information and Internet Services; Computer Software
K11 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - Property Law
O34 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Technological Change - - - Intellectual Property Rights

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Bae, Sang Hoo & Choi, Jay Pil, 2006. "A model of piracy," Information Economics and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 18(3), pages 303-320, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Oecd, 1998. "Electronic Commerce: Prices and Consumer Issues for Three Products: Books, Compact Discs and Software," OECD Digital Economy Papers 32, OECD, Directorate for Science, Technology and Industry. [Downloadable!]
  3. P Belleflamme & P M Picard, 2003. "Competition over Piratable Goods," The School of Economics Discussion Paper Series 0332, Economics, The University of Manchester. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  4. Yoon, Kiho, 2002. "The optimal level of copyright protection," Information Economics and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 14(3), pages 327-348, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. BOCCARD, Nicolas & WAUTHY, Xavier, 1997. "The hotelling model with capacity precommitment," CORE Discussion Papers 1997083, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    Other versions:
  6. Oz Shy & Jacques-Françlois Thisse, 1999. "A Strategic Approach to Software Protection," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 8(2), pages 163-190, 06. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Nicolas Boccard & Xavier Wauthy, 2003. "Optimal Quotas, Price Competition And Products' Attributes," The Japanese Economic Review, Japanese Economic Association, vol. 54(4), pages 395-408. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Landes, William M & Posner, Richard A, 1989. "An Economic Analysis of Copyright Law," Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 18(2), pages 325-63, June.
  9. Takeyama, Lisa N, 1994. "The Welfare Implications of Unauthorized Reproduction of Intellectual Property in the Presence of Demand Network Externalities," Journal of Industrial Economics, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 42(2), pages 155-66, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Besen, Stanley M & Raskind, Leo J, 1991. "An Introduction to the Law and Economics of Intellectual Property," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 5(1), pages 3-27, Winter. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Michael R. Baye & John Morgan, 2001. "Information Gatekeepers on the Internet and the Competitiveness of Homogeneous Product Markets," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 91(3), pages 454-474, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  12. Liebowitz, S J, 1985. "Copying and Indirect Appropriability: Photocopying of Journals," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 93(5), pages 945-57, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  13. Varian, Hal R, 1980. "A Model of Sales," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 70(4), pages 651-59, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  14. Mussa, Michael & Rosen, Sherwin, 1978. "Monopoly and product quality," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 18(2), pages 301-317, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  15. Koboldt, Christian, 1995. "Intellectual Property and Optimal Copyright Protection," CSLE Discussion Paper Series 95-01, Saarland University, CSLE - Center for the Study of Law and Economics. [Downloadable!]
  16. Gayer, Amit & Shy, Oz, 2003. "Copyright protection and hardware taxation," Information Economics and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 15(4), pages 467-483, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  17. Martin Peitz & Patrick Waelbroeck, 2003. "Piracy of Digital Products: A Critical Review of the Economics Literature," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
  18. Johnson, William R, 1985. "The Economics of Copying," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 93(1), pages 158-74, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  19. Novos, Ian E & Waldman, Michael, 1984. "The Effects of Increased Copyright Protection: An Analytic Approach," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 92(2), pages 236-46, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  20. Besen, Stanley M & Kirby, Sheila Nataraj, 1989. "Private Copying, Appropriability, and Optimal Copying Royalties," Journal of Law & Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 32(2), pages 255-80, October.
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Francisco Martínez-Sánchez, 2009. "Collusion, competition and piracy," Working Papers. Serie AD 2009-20, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie). [Downloadable!]
  2. Francisco Martinez, 2008. "Learning by Copying," ThE Papers 08/05, Department of Economic Theory and Economic History of the University of Granada.. [Downloadable!]
  3. Alessandro Balestrino, 2007. "It is a Theft but not a Crime," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
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