Competition over Piratable Goods
AbstractThe effects of (private, small-scale) copying on the pricing behavior of producers of information goods are studied within a unified model of vertical differentiation. Although information goods are assumed to be perfectly horizon tally differentiated, demands are interdependent because the copying technology exhibits increasing returns to scale. We characterize the symmetric Nash equilibria of the pricing game played by n producers of information goods. We show thereby how the producers' attitudes towards piracy are interdependent and evolve with the relative attractiveness of copies.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Economics, The University of Manchester in its series The School of Economics Discussion Paper Series with number 0332.
Date of creation: 2003
Date of revision:
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Other versions of this item:
- L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
- L82 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Services - - - Entertainment; Media
- L86 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Services - - - Information and Internet Services; Computer Software
- K11 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - Property Law
- O34 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Technological Change; Research and Development; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Intellectual Property and Intellectual Capital
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- Bae, Sang Hoo & Choi, Jay Pil, 2006. "A model of piracy," Information Economics and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 18(3), pages 303-320, September.
- Johnson, William R, 1985. "The Economics of Copying," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 93(1), pages 158-74, February.
- Martin Peitz & Patrick Waelbroeck, 2003. "Piracy of Digital Products: A Critical Review of the Economics Literature," CESifo Working Paper Series 1071, CESifo Group Munich.
- Paul Belleflamme, 2002. "Pricing Information Goods in the Presence of Copying," Working Papers 463, Queen Mary, University of London, School of Economics and Finance.
- BELLEFLAMME, Paul & PICARD, Pierre, 2005.
"Piracy and competition,"
CORE Discussion Papers
2005083, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Paul Belleflamme & Pierre M. Picard, 2004. "Piracy and Competition," CESifo Working Paper Series 1350, CESifo Group Munich.
- BELLEFLAMME, Paul & PICARD, Pierre M., . "Piracy and competition," CORE Discussion Papers RP -1919, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Paul, BELLEFLAMME & Pierre, PICARD, 2005. "Piracy and competition," Discussion Papers (ECON - DÃ©partement des Sciences Economiques) 2005057, Université catholique de Louvain, Département des Sciences Economiques.
- Peitz, Martin & Waelbroeck, Patrick, 2006. "Piracy of digital products: A critical review of the theoretical literature," Information Economics and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 18(4), pages 449-476, November.
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