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Uniform Continuity Of The Value Of Zero-Sum Games With Differential Information

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  • Ezra Einy

    ()

  • Ori Haimanko

    ()

  • Diego Moreno

    ()

  • Benyamin Shitovitz

    ()

Abstract

We establish uniform continuity of the value for zero-sum games with differential information, when the distance between changing information fields of each player is measured by the Boylan (1971) pseudo-metric. We also show that the optimal strategy correspondence is upper semicontinuous when the information fields of players change, even with the weak topology on players' strategy sets.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Universidad Carlos III, Departamento de Economía in its series Economics Working Papers with number we041603.

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Date of creation: Mar 2004
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Handle: RePEc:cte:werepe:we041603

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  1. Kajii, Atsushi & Morris, Stephen, 1998. "Payoff Continuity in Incomplete Information Games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 82(1), pages 267-276, September.
  2. Stinchcombe, Maxwell B., 1990. "Bayesian information topologies," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 19(3), pages 233-253.
  3. Paul Milgrom & Robert Weber, 1981. "Distributional Strategies for Games with Incomplete Information," Discussion Papers 428R, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  4. Ezra Einy & Ori Haimanko & Diego Moreno & Benyamin Shitovitz, 2003. "On The Continuity Of Equilibrium And Core Correspondences In Economies With Differential Information," Economics Working Papers we032707, Universidad Carlos III, Departamento de Economía.
  5. Cotter, Kevin D., 1986. "Similarity of information and behavior with a pointwise convergence topology," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 15(1), pages 25-38, February.
  6. Van Zandt, Timothy, 2002. "Information, measurability, and continuous behavior," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 38(3), pages 293-309, November.
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