Uniform Continuity of the Value of Zero-Sum Games with Differential Information
AbstractWe establish uniform continuity of the value for zero-sum games with differential information, when the distance between changing information fields of each player is measured by the Boylan (1971) pseudo-metric. We also show that the optimal strategy correspondence is upper semi-continuous when the information fields of players change (even with the weak topology on players' strategy sets), and is approximately lower semi-continuous.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Graduate School of Economics, Hitotsubashi University in its series Discussion Papers with number 2007-02.
Length: 18 p.
Date of creation: Apr 2007
Date of revision:
Note: Revised version of Discussion Paper # 04-04 of Monaster Center for Economic Research, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev.
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Web page: http://www.econ.hit-u.ac.jp/
More information through EDIRC
Zero-Sum Games; Differential Information; Value; Op-timal Strategies; Uniform Continuity;
Other versions of this item:
- Ezra Einy & Ori Haimanko & Diego Moreno & Benyamin Shitovitz, 2004. "Uniform Continuity Of The Value Of Zero-Sum Games With Differential Information," Economics Working Papers we041603, Universidad Carlos III, Departamento de Economía.
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
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- Ezra Einy & Ori Haimanko & Diego Moreno & Benyamin Shitovitz, 2003.
"On The Continuity Of Equilibrium And Core Correspondences In Economies With Differential Information,"
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