Public Education and Democracy in a Simple Model of Persistent Inequality
AbstractThe paper introduces public education fiÃƒï¿½Ã¯Â¿Â½nanced by linear taxation into a standard model of persistent inequality. It obtains the straightforward conclusion that agents with income above the average will prefer a positive tax rate. This implies a majority of agents supporting the introduction of public education suggesting that democracy is necessary and sufficient condition for redistribution.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University of Crete, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 1204.
Date of creation: 18 Jul 2012
Date of revision:
Public education; persistent inequality; democracy;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- H4 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2012-09-22 (All new papers)
- NEP-EDU-2012-09-22 (Education)
- NEP-PBE-2012-09-22 (Public Economics)
- NEP-POL-2012-09-22 (Positive Political Economics)
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