The paper empirically investigates the phenomenon of patent litigation through the analysis of the all population of European patents’ opposition cases in the telecommunication industry. We recover the complete legal history of each dispute and the patent portfolios of the firms involved. We suggest that in an industry characterised by strong technological complementarities the distribution of patent rights may induce situations of mutual hold-up among innovators. The risk of retaliation through counter-suits represents a credible threat that can eventually favour the instauration of collusive behaviours. Our results confirm this hypothesis, since the occurrence of patent oppositions among large incumbents is significantly lower than industry average.
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Paper provided by CESPRI, Centre for Research on Innovation and Internationalisation, Universita' Bocconi, Milano, Italy in its series CESPRI Working Papers with number
158.
Length: 30 pages Date of creation: Jul 2004 Date of revision:
Jul 2004 Handle: RePEc:cri:cespri:wp158
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Find related papers by JEL classification: K41 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Litigation Process O34 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Technological Change - - - Intellectual Property Rights
References listed on IDEAS Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
Josh Lerner & Jean Tirole, 2002.
"Efficient Patent Pools,"
NBER Working Papers
9175, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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Cited by: (explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)
Nicolas van Zeebroeck, 2007.
"The puzzle of patent value indicators,"
Working Papers CEB
07-023.RS, Université Libre de Bruxelles, Solvay Brussels School of Economics and Management, Centre Emile Bernheim (CEB).
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