Patent Oppositions

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Patent Oppositions

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Jonathan Levin (Stanford University)
Richard Levin (Yale University)

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Jonathan Levin

Abstract

In recent years, patent protection has extended into new areas, giving rise to serious concern about the lack of clear guidelines for patentability. We analyze the effect of introducing a patent opposition process that would allow patent validity to be challenged directly after a patent is granted. In many cases, such a system would avoid costly litigation at a later date. In other cases, the opposition process would increase the cost of conflict resolution, but would also reward holders of valid patents and limit the rewards to invalid patents. Our analysis suggests significant positive welfare gains from the introduction of a patent opposition process.

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Paper provided by Yale Law School John M. Olin Center for Studies in Law, Economics, and Public Policy in its series Yale Law School John M. Olin Center for Studies in Law, Economics, and Public Policy Working Paper Series with number yale_lepp-1005.

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Handle: RePEc:bep:yaloln:yale_lepp-1005

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This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

NEP-ALL-2004-07-26 (All new papers)
NEP-LAW-2004-07-26 (Law & Economics)

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Bronwyn H. Hall & Stuart J. H. Graham & Dietmar Harhoff & David C. Mowery, 2004. "Prospects for Improving U.S. Patent Quality via Post-grant Opposition," Law and Economics 0401002, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Bronwyn Hall & Stuart Graham & Dietmar Harhoff & David Mowery, 2003. "Prospects for Improving U.S. Patent Quality via Post-grant Opposition," Department of Economics, Working Paper Series 1054, Department of Economics, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley. [Downloadable!]
- Bronwyn H. Hall & Stuart J.H. Graham & Dietmar Harhoff, 2003. "Prospects for Improving U.S. Patent Quality via Post-grant Opposition," NBER Working Papers 9731, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
- Bronwyn H. Hall & Stuart Graham & Dietmar Harhoff & David C. Mowery, 2004. "Prospects for Improving U.S. Patent Quality via Postgrant Opposition," NBER Chapters, in: Innovation Policy and the Economy, Volume 4, pages 115-144 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!]
Graham, Stuart J.H. & Harhoff, Dietmar, 2006. "Can Post-Grant Reviews Improve Patent System Design? A Twin Study of US and European Patents," CEPR Discussion Papers 5680, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
- Stuart J.H. Graham & Dietmar Harhoff, 2006. "Can Post-Grant Reviews Improve Patent System Design? A Twin Study of US and European Patents," Discussion Papers 38, SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich. [Downloadable!]
Mario Calderini & Giuseppe Scellato, 2004. "Intellectual property rights as strategic assets: the case of european patent opposition in the telecommunication industry," CESPRI Working Papers 158, CESPRI, Centre for Research on Innovation and Internationalisation, Universita' Bocconi, Milano, Italy, revised Jul 2004. [Downloadable!]
Bulow, Jeremy I., 2003. "The Gaming of Pharmaceutical Patents," Research Papers 1804, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business. [Downloadable!]
Bronwyn H. Hall, 2003. "Business Method Patents, Innovation, and Policy," NBER Working Papers 9717, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
- Bronwyn H. Hall, 2004. "Business Method Patents, Innovation, and Policy," Law and Economics 0401001, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
- Bronwyn Hall, 2003. "Business Method Patents, Innovation, and Policy," Department of Economics, Working Paper Series 1056, Department of Economics, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley. [Downloadable!]
Bronwyn H. Hall, 2009. "Business and Financial Method Patents, Innovation, and Policy," NBER Working Papers 14868, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

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This page was last updated on 2009-11-19.

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