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Towards A More Perfect EMU

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  • Wyplosz, Charles

Abstract

This paper explores the unfinished business of preparing for an harmonious monetary union, "more perfect" than the coarse model set up in the Maastricht and Amsterdam Treaties. To start with, the ECB may fear that it has to live up to its stated lexicographic mission for fear of losing credibility in the crucial start-up phase. Next, the ECB will have to re-think its official determination to only care about average European conditions. Some form of "monetary federalism" is needed, and an example is provided, using estimated central bank reaction functions. Finally, the institutional set-up is too unwieldy to deliver a good policy mix and permit adequate accountability. One money is hardly compatible with eleven governments, twelve Central Bank Governors and twelve Parliaments, each of which would be unwilling to share some power. In particular, governments will have to decide whether to allow competition among national institutions, chiefly labour markets, or whether they will look for collusion to protect the least performing ones.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers in its series CEPR Discussion Papers with number 2252.

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Date of creation: Oct 1999
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Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:2252

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Related research

Keywords: Accountability; European Monetary Union; Institution Design; Policy Coordination; Policy Mix;

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References

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  1. Lars E O Svensson, 1996. "Inflation Forecast Targeting: Implementing and Monitoring Inflation Targets," Bank of England working papers 56, Bank of England.
  2. Persson, Torsten & Tabellini, Guido, 1995. "Double-Edged Incentives: Institutions and Policy Coordination," CEPR Discussion Papers 1141, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  3. Calmfors, L., 1998. "Unemployment, Labour-Market Reform and Monetary Union," Papers 639, Stockholm - International Economic Studies.
  4. Gerlach, Stefan & Smets, Frank, 1999. "Output gaps and monetary policy in the EMU area1," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 43(4-6), pages 801-812, April.
  5. Richard Clarida & Jordi Gali & Mark Gertler, 1997. "Monetary Policy Rules in Practice: Some International Evidence," NBER Working Papers 6254, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  6. Alex Cukierman & Francesco Lippi, 2000. "Labor Markets and Monetary Union; a Strategic Analysis," Temi di discussione (Economic working papers) 365, Bank of Italy, Economic Research and International Relations Area.
  7. Bean, Charles R, 1992. "Economic and Monetary Union in Europe," CEPR Discussion Papers 722, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  8. Stephen Nickell, 1997. "Unemployment and Labor Market Rigidities: Europe versus North America," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 11(3), pages 55-74, Summer.
  9. Saint-Paul, Gilles, 1993. "On the Political Economy of Labour Market Flexibility," CEPR Discussion Papers 803, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  10. Charles Wyplosz, 1997. "EMU: Why and How It Might Happen," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 11(4), pages 3-21, Fall.
  11. Juan F. Jimeno & Jose Vinals, 1998. "The impact of EMU on European unemployment," Working Papers 34, Oesterreichische Nationalbank (Austrian Central Bank).
  12. D. Begg & F. Giavazzi & Ch. Wyplosz, 1999. "Options for the Future Exchange RatePolicy of the EMU," VOPROSY ECONOMIKI, N.P. Redaktsiya zhurnala "Voprosy Economiki", vol. 1.
  13. Taylor, John B., 1993. "Discretion versus policy rules in practice," Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, Elsevier, vol. 39(1), pages 195-214, December.
  14. Calmfors, Lars, 1998. "Unemployment, Labour-Market Reform and Monetary Union," Seminar Papers 639, Stockholm University, Institute for International Economic Studies.
  15. Viñals, José, 1998. "Monetary Policy and Inflation: From Theory to Practice," CEPR Discussion Papers 1821, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  16. Thomas J. Sargent & Neil Wallace, 1981. "Some unpleasant monetarist arithmetic," Quarterly Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, issue Fall.
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