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Redistribution, Voting and Clientelism: Evidence from the Italian Land Reform

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  • Casaburi, Lorenzo
  • Caprettini, Bruno
  • Venturini, Miriam

Abstract

Many democracies around the world feature pervasive clientelist practices. Inequality is often considered a key determinant of these practices. By reducing inequality, redistributive policies may therefore undermine clientelism. However, by inducing gratitude and reciprocity among beneficiaries, redistribution may also initiate clientelist exchange. We study the long-term effects of a major redistribution policy: the 1950 Italian land reform. Using a panel spatial regression discontinuity and data for half a century, we show that the large-scale redistribution led to the emergence of a long-lasting clientelist system characterized by political brokers, patronage and targeted benefits. Within this system, the Christian Democratic party, which promoted the reform, experienced persistent electoral benefits.

Suggested Citation

  • Casaburi, Lorenzo & Caprettini, Bruno & Venturini, Miriam, 2021. "Redistribution, Voting and Clientelism: Evidence from the Italian Land Reform," CEPR Discussion Papers 15679, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    • Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:15679
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Redistribution; Voting; Clientelism; Land reform; Italy;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • P16 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Capitalist Economies - - - Capitalist Institutions; Welfare State
    • N44 - Economic History - - Government, War, Law, International Relations, and Regulation - - - Europe: 1913-
    • Q15 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Agriculture - - - Land Ownership and Tenure; Land Reform; Land Use; Irrigation; Agriculture and Environment
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior

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