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Why Trump Shot the Sheriffs: The End of WTO Dispute Settlement 1.0

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  • Bown, Chad
  • Keynes, Soumaya

Abstract

On December 10, 2019, the WTO’s 25-year-old system of resolving disputes broke down. This paper explains why. It describes the dysfunctional system that preceded the WTO, when the United States dealt with politically troublesome imports by using voluntary export restraints and increasingly resorted to the “aggressively unilateral†Section 301 policy to resolve trade concerns. The WTO was a compromise between the rest of the world and the United States, whereby the latter accepted some constraints with the expectation that the new system of binding dispute settlement would serve its interests. But although the creation of the WTO resolved some concerns about American unilateralism in the short term, its system of handling disputes turned out to be politically unsustainable.

Suggested Citation

  • Bown, Chad & Keynes, Soumaya, 2020. "Why Trump Shot the Sheriffs: The End of WTO Dispute Settlement 1.0," CEPR Discussion Papers 14477, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    • Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:14477
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    Cited by:

    1. Chad Brown & Paola Conconi & Aksel Erbahar & Lorenzo Trimarchi, 2020. "Trade Protection Along Supply Chains," Working Papers ECARES 2020-52, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
    2. Bown, Chad, 2020. "Export Controls: America’s Other National Security Threat," CEPR Discussion Papers 14739, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    3. Giuseppe Zaccaria, 2022. "You’re Fired! International Courts, Re‐contracting, and the WTO Appellate Body during the Trump Presidency," Global Policy, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 13(3), pages 322-333, June.
    4. Johann Robert Basedow, 2022. "Why de‐judicialize? Explaining state preferences on judicialization in World Trade Organization Dispute Settlement Body and Investor‐to‐State Dispute Settlement reforms," Regulation & Governance, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 16(4), pages 1362-1381, October.
    5. Bown, Chad P., 2021. "The US–China trade war and Phase One agreement," Journal of Policy Modeling, Elsevier, vol. 43(4), pages 805-843.
    6. Ian M. Sheldon, 2022. "The United States' power‐based bargaining and the WTO: Has anything really been gained?," Applied Economic Perspectives and Policy, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 44(3), pages 1424-1439, September.
    7. Paul Laurent, & Jeudy Bruno-Philippe., 2021. "Le blocage de l’OMC, un révélateur de la crise du multilatéralisme ?," Bulletin de la Banque de France, Banque de France, issue 234.
    8. Mauro Caselli & Andrea Fracasso & Stefano Schiavo, 2021. "Trade policy and firm performance: introduction to the special section," Economia Politica: Journal of Analytical and Institutional Economics, Springer;Fondazione Edison, vol. 38(1), pages 1-6, April.
    9. Eugene Beaulieu & Janet Whittaker, 2021. ""Two roads diverged in [soft]wood". Targeted dumping, differential pricing methodology, and zeroing: US-Canada anti-dumping in softwood lumber (WTDS534/R)," RSCAS Working Papers 2021/11, European University Institute.
    10. Jason H. Grant & Kathryn A. Boys & Chaoping Xie, 2021. "A new president in the White House: implications for Canadian agricultural trade," Canadian Journal of Agricultural Economics/Revue canadienne d'agroeconomie, Canadian Agricultural Economics Society/Societe canadienne d'agroeconomie, vol. 69(1), pages 45-58, March.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Wto; Dispute settlement; Appellate body; Antidumping; Trade remedies;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • F13 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Trade Policy; International Trade Organizations

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