Group Identity and Coalition Formation: Experiments in a three?player divide the dollar Game
AbstractThis paper is an experimental study on the effect of group identity on the formation of coalitions and the resulting distribution of resources. After inducing group identity based on preferences over paintings, subjects play symmetric three-player _divide the dollar_ games with a majority rule decision process. The main finding is that where two players are from one group and one from the other, those in the minority earn significantly less than majority players. This is largely a result of a two-way split between majority players occurring more frequently, either because of the increased salience of this outcome, or a shift in social preferences.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by CEPREMAP in its series CEPREMAP Working Papers (Docweb) with number 1020.
Length: 35 pages
Date of creation: Jun 2010
Date of revision:
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2011-04-16 (All new papers)
- NEP-CBE-2011-04-16 (Cognitive & Behavioural Economics)
- NEP-CDM-2011-04-16 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-EVO-2011-04-16 (Evolutionary Economics)
- NEP-EXP-2011-04-16 (Experimental Economics)
- NEP-GTH-2011-04-16 (Game Theory)
- NEP-NET-2011-04-16 (Network Economics)
- NEP-POL-2011-04-16 (Positive Political Economics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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- Sheryl Ball & Catherine Eckel & Philip J. Grossman & William Zame, 2001. "Status In Markets," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 116(1), pages 161-188, February.
- Holm, Håkan, 2000. "What’s in a Name? - An ethnical discrimination experiment," Working Papers 2000:3, Lund University, Department of Economics, revised 16 Apr 2001.
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