Intergenerational Risk Sharing in Time-Consistent Funded Pension Schemes
AbstractIntergenerational risk sharing by funded pension schemes may increase welfare in an ex ante sense. However, it also suffers from a time inconsistency problem. In particular, young generations may be unwilling to start participating in a pension scheme if this requires them to make huge transfers to older generations. This paper explores if limiting the transfers between generations can make a funded pension scheme time-consistent. The paper finds that this is possible indeed in a more or less realistic economic environment; it is not the case in general however. The form of the time-consistent scheme (how strong are the limits to transfers) is found to be very responsive to the economic environment. The time-consistent scheme offers lower welfare than the original time-inconsistent scheme, but higher welfare than a defined-contribution scheme without any intergenerational risk sharing.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis in its series CPB Discussion Paper with number 176.
Date of creation: Apr 2011
Date of revision:
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- H55 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Social Security and Public Pensions
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-AGE-2011-04-09 (Economics of Ageing)
- NEP-ALL-2011-04-09 (All new papers)
- NEP-DGE-2011-04-09 (Dynamic General Equilibrium)
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CSEF Working Papers
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