Strategic immigration policies and welfare in heterogeneous countries

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Strategic immigration policies and welfare in heterogeneous countries

Author Info

FUJITA, Masahisa
WEBER, Shlomo

Abstract

In this paper we consider a model with two industrialized countries and immigrants that come from "the rest of the world".The countries are distinguished on the basis of three parameters: population size, bias toward immigrants, and production complementarity between native population and immigrants. We consider a non-cooperative game where each country makes a strategic choice of its immigration quota. We first show that our game admits a unique pure strategy Nash equilibrium and then study the welfare implications of countries' choices. It turns out that a country with a higher degree of production complementarity and a higher level of tolerance towards immigrants would allow a larger immigration quota and achieve a higher welfare level. Our results call for coordinated and harmonized immigration policies that may improve the welfare of both countries.

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Paper provided by Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) in its series CORE Discussion Papers with number 2003095.

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Date of creation: 01 Dec 2003
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Handle: RePEc:cor:louvco:2003095

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
F22 - International Economics - - International Factor Movements and International Business - - - International Migration
O3 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Technological Change
R1 - Urban, Rural, and Regional Economics - - General Regional Economics

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

Richard Florida, 2002. "Bohemia and economic geography," Journal of Economic Geography, Oxford University Press, vol. 2(1), pages 55-71, January.
Esteban, Joan & Ray, Debraj, 1994. "On the Measurement of Polarization," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 62(4), pages 819-51, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
- Joan-Maria Esteban & Debraj Ray, 1991. "On the Measurement of Polarization," Boston University - Institute for Economic Development 18, Boston University, Institute for Economic Development.
- Esteban, J. & Ray, D., 1993. "On the Measurement of Polarization," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 221.93, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
- Esteban, J.M. & Ray, D., 1992. "On the Measurement of Polarization," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 171.92, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).

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(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

Marcus Berliant & Masahisa Fujita, 2004. "Knowledge Creation as a Square Dance on the Hilbert Cube," Game Theory and Information 0401004, EconWPA, revised 27 Jan 2004. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Berliant, Marcus & Fujita, Masahisa, 2007. "Knowledge creation as a square dance on the Hilbert cube," MPRA Paper 2884, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
- Marcus Berliant & Masahisa Fujita, 2005. "Knowledge Creation as a Square Dance on the Hilbert Cube," Game Theory and Information 0506006, EconWPA, revised 26 Sep 2005. [Downloadable!]
- Marcus Berliant & Masahisa Fujita, 2004. "Knowledge Creation as a Square Dance on the Hilbert Cube," KIER Working Papers 580, Kyoto University, Institute of Economic Research.
- Masahisa Fujita & Marcus Berliant, 2004. "Knowledge Creation as a Square Dance on the Hilbert Cube," Econometric Society 2004 North American Summer Meetings 204, Econometric Society. [Downloadable!]
- Berliant, Marcus & Fujita, Masahisa, 2004. "Knowledge Creation as a Square Dance on the Hilbert Cube," IDE Discussion Papers 14, Institute of Developing Economies, Japan External Trade Organization(JETRO). [Downloadable!]
- Marcus Berliant & Masahisa Fujita, 2008. "Knowledge Creation As A Square Dance On The Hilbert Cube," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 49(4), pages 1251-1295, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

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