In this paper, we consider a European industry characterized by vertical product differentiation. Using a two-stage model with quality choice made before price competition takes place, we show that EU antidumping policy that takes the form of price-undertakings offers a powerful protection to domestic Þrms, but only at the price competition stage. Once the impact of the A-D policy on quality choices is taken into account, European Welfare as well as proÞts accruing to the domestic Þrm decrease whenever the free trade equilibrium is affected. Hence we show that European Antidumping policies may induce ÒperverseÓ leapfrogging
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Paper provided by Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) in its series CORE Discussion Papers with number
1999016.
Find related papers by JEL classification: F13 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Trade Policy; International Trade Organizations L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
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