Union Wage Bargaining and European Antidumping Policy in Imperfectly Competitive Markets
AbstractThe purpose of this paper is to analyse the interaction between union bargaining power and the likelihood and type of European antidumping measures (duties and undertakings) in imperfectly competitive product markets. We present a simple theoretical model which is well embedded in EU legal practice, to show that cost asymmetries, induced by union wage bargaining in a European firm, lead to an increase in both the likelihood and the level of antidumping protection against foreign imports of a similar product. In addition, our results indicate that a cost asymmetry, in the form of a unionized wage differential, alters the relative probability of a duty versus an undertaking. We show that the size of these effects depends on the intensity of product market competition. In a further step, we use Belgian firm level micro-data to provide some evidence for our predictions.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers in its series CEPR Discussion Papers with number 1860.
Date of creation: Apr 1998
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- KONINGS, Jozef & VANDENBUSSCHE, Hylke & VEUGELERS, Reinhilde, 1998. "Union wage bargaining and European antidumping policy in imperfectly competitive markets," SESO Working Papers 1998003, University of Antwerp, Faculty of Applied Economics.
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
- F13 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Trade Policy; International Trade Organizations
- J51 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor-Management Relations, Trade Unions, and Collective Bargaining - - - Trade Unions: Objectives, Structure, and Effects
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- Vandenbussche H. & Wauthy X., 1999.
"European antidumping policy and firms' strategic cholce of quality,"
1999007, University of Antwerp, Faculty of Applied Economics.
- VANDENBUSSCHE, Hylke & WAUTHY, Xavier, 1999. "European antidumping policy and firms’ strategic choice of quality," CORE Discussion Papers 1999016, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Vandenbussche, Hylke & Wauthy, Xavier, 2000. "European Antidumping Policy and Firms' Strategic Choice of Quality," CEPR Discussion Papers 2624, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Jerger, Jurgen, 2002. "Globalization, wage setting, and the welfare state," Journal of Policy Modeling, Elsevier, vol. 24(1), pages 1-18, March.
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