Low-quality leadership in a vertically differentiated duopoly with Cournot competition
AbstractWe model a vertically differentiated duopoly with quantity-setting firms as an extended game in which firms noncooperatively choose the timing of moves at the quality stage, to show that at the subgame, perfect equilibrium sequential play obtains, with the low-quality firm taking the leader’s role.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal Economics Letters.
Volume (Year): 115 (2012)
Issue (Month): 3 ()
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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/ecolet
Endogenous timing; Product quality; Sequential play;
Other versions of this item:
- L. Lambertini & A. Tampieri, 2011. "Low-Quality Leadership in a Vertically Differentiated Duopoly with Cournot Competition," Working Papers wp750, Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna.
- C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
- L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
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