Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

Would you like to enter first with a low-quality good?

Contents:

Author Info

  • L. Lambertini
  • P. Tedeschi

Abstract

Using a two-period duopoly model with vertical differentiation, we show that there exists a unique subgame perfect equilibrium where the first entrant supplies a lower quality and gains higher profits than the second entrant. We also prove that this entry sequence is socially efficient.

(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://www2.dse.unibo.it/wp/494.pdf
Download Restriction: no

Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna in its series Working Papers with number 494.

as in new window
Length:
Date of creation: 2003
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:bol:bodewp:494

Contact details of provider:
Postal: Piazza Scaravilli, 2, and Strada Maggiore, 45, 40125 Bologna
Phone: +39 051 209 8019 and 2600
Fax: +39 051 209 8040 and 2664
Web page: http://www.dse.unibo.it
More information through EDIRC

Related research

Keywords:

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. GABSZEWICZ, Jean J. & THISSE, Jacques-François, . "Entry (and exit) in a differentiated industry," CORE Discussion Papers RP, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) -400, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  2. Mussa, Michael & Rosen, Sherwin, 1978. "Monopoly and product quality," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 18(2), pages 301-317, August.
  3. Luca Lambertini, 1994. "Choosing Roles in a Duopoly for Endogenously Differentiated Products," Working Papers 191, Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna.
  4. Prajit K. Dutta & Saul Lach & Aldo Rustichini, 1993. "Better Late Than Early: Vertical Differentiation in the Adoption of a New Technology," NBER Working Papers 4473, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  5. Aoki, Reiko & Prusa, Thomas J., 1997. "Sequential versus simultaneous choice with endogenous quality," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 15(1), pages 103-121, February.
  6. CREMER, Helmuth & THISSE, Jacques-François, . "Location models of horizontal differentiation: a special case of vertical differentiation models," CORE Discussion Papers RP, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) -931, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  7. Ulrich Lehmann-Grube, 1997. "Strategic Choice of Quality When Quality is Costly: The Persistence of the High-Quality Advantage," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 28(2), pages 372-384, Summer.
  8. Lambertini, Luca, 1997. "Unicity of the equilibrium in the unconstrained Hotelling model," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 27(6), pages 785-798, November.
  9. Luca LAMBERTINI, 1997. "The multiproduct monopolist under vertical differentiation : An inductive approach," Discussion Papers (REL - Recherches Economiques de Louvain) 1997021, Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES).
  10. Heidrun C. Hoppe & Ulrich Lehmann-Grube, 2001. "Second-Mover Advantages in Dynamic Quality Competition," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 10(3), pages 419-433, 09.
  11. GABSZEWICZ, Jean J. & THISSE, Jacques-François, . "Price competition, quality and income disparities," CORE Discussion Papers RP, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) -370, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  12. Donnenfeld, Shabtai & Weber, Shlomo, 1992. "Vertical product differentiation with entry," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 10(3), pages 449-472, September.
  13. A. Michael Spence, 1975. "Monopoly, Quality, and Regulation," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, The RAND Corporation, vol. 6(2), pages 417-429, Autumn.
  14. Shaked, Avner & Sutton, John, 1982. "Relaxing Price Competition through Product Differentiation," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 49(1), pages 3-13, January.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. L. Lambertini & A. Tampieri, 2011. "Low-Quality Leadership in a Vertically Differentiated Duopoly with Cournot Competition," Working Papers wp750, Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bol:bodewp:494. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Luca Miselli).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.