Would you like to enter first with a low-quality good?
AbstractUsing a two-period duopoly model with vertical differentiation, we show that there exists a unique subgame perfect equilibrium where the first entrant supplies a lower quality and gains higher profits than the second entrant. We also prove that this entry sequence is socially efficient.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna in its series Working Papers with number 494.
Date of creation: 2003
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Other versions of this item:
- Luca Lambertini & Piero Tedeschi, 2007. "Would You Like To Enter First With A Low-Quality Good?," Bulletin of Economic Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 59(3), pages 269-282, 07.
- Luca Lambertini & Piero Tedeschi, 2006. "Would you like to enter first with a low-quality good?," Working Papers 20060504, Università degli Studi di Milano-Bicocca, Dipartimento di Statistica.
- C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
- D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
- L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
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wp750, Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna.
- Lambertini, Luca & Tampieri, Alessandro, 2012. "Low-quality leadership in a vertically differentiated duopoly with Cournot competition," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 115(3), pages 396-398.
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