Recientemente, varios experimentos han mostrado que los individuos exhiben un comportamiento auténticamente recíproco en interacciones anónimas que se dan una sola vez ('one-shot'). En tanto que se ha mostrado que la reciprocidad es relevante en múltiples campos de la economía, han existido varios intentos por modelar el comportamiento recíproco. Este documento revisa los modelos de reciprocidad que se fundamentan en las intenciones y presenta un ejemplo para el caso del manejo de los profesores en el sector público, en el que el gobierno ofrece un esquema de incentivos para la implementación de un programa. Este esquema tiene la estructura del dilema del prisionero. Tanto en los juegos simultáneos como secuenciales, los resultados de equilibrio puede ser distintos a los que predice la teoría convencional. ************************************************************************ In recent years, several experiments have shown that individuals exhibit authentic reciprocal behavior in anonymous one-shot interactions. As reciprocity has been shown to be relevant in several economic fields, there have also been several attempts to model reciprocical behavior. I review the intention-based models of reciprocity and present an example in teachers´ management in the public sector in which a government offers an incentive scheme to implement a program. The incentive scheme has the prisioner’s dilemma structure, In both simultaneous and sequential games, in equilibrium reciprocal teachers may reach other equilibria different from those predicted by the standard theory.
Download Info
To download:
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the
proper application to
view it first. Information about this may be contained
in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read
the IDEAS help
file. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS
site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Publisher Info
Paper provided by UNIVERSIDAD DEL ROSARIO - FACULTAD DE ECONOMÍA in its series BORRADORES DE INVESTIGACIÓN with number
002904.
References listed on IDEAS Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.: