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A Model of Optimal Persuasion Rules

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Author Info
Jacob Glazer
Ariel Rubinstein

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Paper provided by UCLA Department of Economics in its series Levine's Bibliography with number 666156000000000012.

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Date of creation: 08 May 2003
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Handle: RePEc:cla:levrem:666156000000000012

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Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Fishman, Michael J & Hagerty, Kathleen M, 1990. "The Optimal Amount of Discretion to Allow in Disclosure," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 105(2), pages 427-44, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Lipman Barton L. & Seppi Duane J., 1995. "Robust Inference in Communication Games with Partial Provability," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 66(2), pages 370-405, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Shin Hyun Song, 1994. "The Burden of Proof in a Game of Persuasion," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 64(1), pages 253-264, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Jesse Bull & Joel Watson, 2002. "Hard Evidence and Mechanism Design," University of California at San Diego, Economics Working Paper Series 2002-16, Department of Economics, UC San Diego. [Downloadable!]
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