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A Model of Optimal Persuasion Rules

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  • Jacob Glazer
  • Ariel Rubinstein

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  • Jacob Glazer & Ariel Rubinstein, 2003. "A Model of Optimal Persuasion Rules," Levine's Bibliography 666156000000000012, UCLA Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:cla:levrem:666156000000000012
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    File URL: http://www.princeton.edu/~ariel/papers/persuasion.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Lipman Barton L. & Seppi Duane J., 1995. "Robust Inference in Communication Games with Partial Provability," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 66(2), pages 370-405, August.
    2. Bull, Jesse & Watson, Joel, 2007. "Hard evidence and mechanism design," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 58(1), pages 75-93, January.
    3. Shin Hyun Song, 1994. "The Burden of Proof in a Game of Persuasion," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 64(1), pages 253-264, October.
    4. Michael J. Fishman & Kathleen M. Hagerty, 1990. "The Optimal Amount of Discretion to Allow in Disclosure," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 105(2), pages 427-444.
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