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Efficient Dynamic Auctions

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  • Dirk Bergemann
  • Juuso Välimäki

Abstract

We consider the truthful implementation of the socially efficient allocation in a dynamic private value environment in which agents receive private information over time. We show that a suitable generalization of the Vickrey-Clark-Groves mechanism, based on the marginal contribution of each agent, leads to truthtelling in every period. A leading example of a dynamic allocation model is the sequential auction of a single good in which the current winner of the object receives additional information about her valuation. We show that a modified sequential second price auction in which only the current winner makes a positive payment leads to truthtelling. In general allocation problems, the marginal contribution mechanism continues to induce truthtelling in every period but may now include positive transfers for many agents.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by UCLA Department of Economics in its series Levine's Bibliography with number 321307000000000580.

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Date of creation: 27 Oct 2006
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Handle: RePEc:cla:levrem:321307000000000580

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  1. Dirk Bergemann & Juuso Valimaki, 1998. "Dynamic Common Agency," Discussion Papers, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science 1259, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  2. repec:wop:humbsf:2000-72 is not listed on IDEAS
  3. Susan Athey & Ilya Segal, 2007. "An Efficient Dynamic Mechanism," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000001134, UCLA Department of Economics.
  4. Freixas, Xavier & Guesnerie, Roger & Tirole, Jean, 1985. "Planning under Incomplete Information and the Ratchet Effect," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 52(2), pages 173-91, April.
  5. Groves, Theodore, 1973. "Incentives in Teams," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 41(4), pages 617-31, July.
  6. Partha Dasgupta & Eric Maskin, 2000. "Efficient Auctions," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, MIT Press, vol. 115(2), pages 341-388, May.
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Cited by:
  1. Gershkov, Alex & Moldovanu, Benny, 2010. "Efficient sequential assignment with incomplete information," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 68(1), pages 144-154, January.
  2. Gershkov, Alex & Moldovanu, Benny, 2007. "The Dynamic Assignment of Heterogenous Objects: A Mechanism Design Approach," CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers 6439, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  3. Hamid Nazerzadeh & Amin Saberi & Rakesh Vohra, 2007. "Dynamic Cost-Per-Action Mechanisms and Applications to Online Advertising," Discussion Papers, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science 1450, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  4. Francis Bloch & David Cantala, 2010. "Markovian assignment rules," Serie documentos de trabajo del Centro de Estudios Económicos, El Colegio de México, Centro de Estudios Económicos 2010-18, El Colegio de México, Centro de Estudios Económicos.

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