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Dynamic Marginal Contribution Mechanism

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  • Juuso Valimaki

    (Helsinki School of Economics)

  • Dirk Bergemann

    (Yale University)

Abstract

We develop the marginal contribution mechanism in detail for a sequential auction of a single object in which each bidders learn over time her true valuation of the object. We show that a modified second price auction leads to truthtelling.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Society for Economic Dynamics in its series 2008 Meeting Papers with number 317.

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Date of creation: 2008
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Handle: RePEc:red:sed008:317

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References

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  1. Benjamin Edelman & Michael Ostrovsky & Michael Schwarz, 2007. "Internet Advertising and the Generalized Second-Price Auction: Selling Billions of Dollars Worth of Keywords," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 97(1), pages 242-259, March.
  2. Groves, Theodore, 1973. "Incentives in Teams," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 41(4), pages 617-31, July.
  3. Dirk & Juuso Valimaki, 1998. "Dynamic Common Agency," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University 1206, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
  4. William Vickrey, 1961. "Counterspeculation, Auctions, And Competitive Sealed Tenders," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, American Finance Association, vol. 16(1), pages 8-37, 03.
  5. Ilya Segal & Susan Athey, 2007. "Designing Efficient Mechanisms for Dynamic Bilateral Trading Games," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 97(2), pages 131-136, May.
  6. repec:wop:humbsf:2000-72 is not listed on IDEAS
  7. P. Dasgupta & Eric Maskin, 1998. "Efficient Auctions," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research 1857, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
  8. Freixas, Xavier & Guesnerie, Roger & Tirole, Jean, 1985. "Planning under Incomplete Information and the Ratchet Effect," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 52(2), pages 173-91, April.
  9. Susan Athey & Ilya Segal, 2007. "Designing Efficient Mechanisms for Dynamic Bilateral Trading Games," Levine's Bibliography 321307000000000892, UCLA Department of Economics.
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Cited by:
  1. Deb, Rahul, 2008. "Optimal Contracting Of New Experience Goods," MPRA Paper 9880, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  2. Said, Maher, 2008. "Information Revelation and Random Entry in Sequential Ascending Auctions," MPRA Paper 7160, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  3. Gershkov, Alex & Moldovanu, Benny, 2012. "Optimal search, learning and implementation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 147(3), pages 881-909.

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