Dynamic Marginal Contribution Mechanism
AbstractWe develop the marginal contribution mechanism in detail for a sequential auction of a single object in which each bidders learn over time her true valuation of the object. We show that a modified second price auction leads to truthtelling.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by UCLA Department of Economics in its series Levine's Bibliography with number 843644000000000300.
Date of creation: 31 Jul 2007
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Other versions of this item:
- Juuso Valimaki & Dirk Bergemann, 2008. "Dynamic Marginal Contribution Mechanism," 2008 Meeting Papers 317, Society for Economic Dynamics.
- Dirk Bergemann & Juuso Valimaki, 2007. "Dynamic Marginal Contribution Mechanism," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1616, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
- D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
- D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search, Learning, and Information
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2007-08-14 (All new papers)
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