Infrastructure policy and governance failures
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- Raballand, Gael & Bridges, Kate & Beuran, Monica & Sacks, Audrey, 2013. "Does the semi-autonomous agency model function in a low-governance environment ? the case of the road development agency in Zambia," Policy Research Working Paper Series 6585, The World Bank.
- Kalle Moene & Tina Søreide, 2015. "Good Governance Facades," CMI Working Papers 2, CMI (Chr. Michelsen Institute), Bergen, Norway.
- Pim Derwort & Nicolas Jager & Jens Newig, 2019. "Towards productive functions? A systematic review of institutional failure, its causes and consequences," Policy Sciences, Springer;Society of Policy Sciences, vol. 52(2), pages 281-298, June.
- Antonio Estache, 2014. "Infrastructure and Corruption: a Brief Survey," Working Papers ECARES ECARES 2014-37, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
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More about this item
Keywords
Political economy; Infrastructure; Regulation; Reform;All these keywords.
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-POL-2013-01-19 (Positive Political Economics)
- NEP-TRE-2013-01-19 (Transport Economics)
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