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Financial Regulation And Performance: Cross-Country Evidence

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  • James R. Barth
  • Gerard Caprio Jr.
  • Ross Levine

Abstract

This paper examines three questions. First, do countries with relatively weak government/ bureaucratic systems impose harsher regulatory restrictions on activities of banks? Second, do countries with more restrictive regulatory systems have poorly functioning banking systems? Third, do countries with more restrictive regulatory systems have a lower probability of suffering a banking crisis? We find that the answers are as follows. Countries with weak government/ bureaucratic systems tend to impose harsher regulatory restrictions on the activities of banks. There is mixed evidence regarding the impact of regulatory restrictions on bank performance. Finally, we find that countries that restrict securities market activities tend to have more fragile banking systems.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Central Bank of Chile in its series Working Papers Central Bank of Chile with number 118.

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Date of creation: Nov 2001
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Handle: RePEc:chb:bcchwp:118

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  1. Levine, Ross & Loayza, Norman & Beck, Thorsten, 2000. "Financial intermediation and growth: Causality and causes," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 46(1), pages 31-77, August.
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Cited by:
  1. Lee, Bong-Soo, 2012. "Bank-based and market-based financial systems: Time-series evidence," Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 20(2), pages 173-197.
  2. Nicola Cetorelli & Michele Gambera, 1999. "Banking Market Structure, Financial Dependence and Growth: International Evidence from Industry Data," Center for Financial Institutions Working Papers 00-19, Wharton School Center for Financial Institutions, University of Pennsylvania.
  3. Mari PANGESTU, 2003. "The Indonesian Bank Crisis And Restructuring: Lessons And Implications For Other Developing Countries," G-24 Discussion Papers 23, United Nations Conference on Trade and Development.
  4. Fotios Pasiouras & Chrysovalantis Gaganis & Constantin Zopounidis, 2006. "The impact of bank regulations, supervision, market structure, and bank characteristics on individual bank ratings: A cross-country analysis," Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, Springer, vol. 27(4), pages 403-438, December.
  5. Fotios Pasiouras & Chrysovalantis Gaganis & Michael Doumpos, 2007. "A multicriteria discrimination approach for the credit rating of Asian banks," Annals of Finance, Springer, vol. 3(3), pages 351-367, July.
  6. Fotios Pasiouras & Chrysovalantis Gaganis & Constantin Zopounidis, 2008. "Regulations, Supervision Approaches and Acquisition Likelihood in the Asian Banking Industry," Asia-Pacific Financial Markets, Springer, vol. 15(2), pages 135-154, June.
  7. Alejandro Micco & Ugo Panizza & Monica Yañez, 2005. "Bank Ownership and Performance Does Politics Matter?," Working Papers Central Bank of Chile 356, Central Bank of Chile.
  8. Armin J. Kammel, 2005. "A Proposal for the Governance of Financial Regulation and Supervision in Europe," Vierteljahrshefte zur Wirtschaftsforschung / Quarterly Journal of Economic Research, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research, vol. 74(4), pages 167-181.
  9. Christophe Godlewski, 2004. "Excess Credit Risk and Bank’s Default Risk An Application of Default Prediction’s Models to Banks from Emerging Market Economies," Finance 0409028, EconWPA.
  10. Cumming, Douglas & Dai, Na & Haß, Lars Helge & Schweizer, Denis, 2012. "Regulatory induced performance persistence: Evidence from hedge funds," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 18(5), pages 1005-1022.
  11. M S Mohanty & Gert Schnabel & Pablo Garcia-Luna, 2006. "Banks and aggregate credit: what is new?," BIS Papers chapters, in: Bank for International Settlements (ed.), The banking system in emerging economies: how much progress has been made?, volume 28, pages 11-39 Bank for International Settlements.

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