Information Revelation and Efficiency in Auctions
AbstractWe study the impact of information revelation on effciency in auctions. In a constrained-efficient mechanism, i.e. a mechanism that is efficient subject to the incentivecompatibility constraint, any additional information available to bidders increases the expected efficiency of the mechanism. This result cannot be extended to a more general setup: in a second-price sealed bid auction, revelation of information might lead to efficiency losses.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Center for Economic and Financial Research (CEFIR) in its series Working Papers with number w0021.
Length: 9 pages
Date of creation: Jun 2002
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Other versions of this item:
- D40 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - General
- D80 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - General
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2003-09-08 (All new papers)
- NEP-DEV-2003-09-08 (Development)
- NEP-LAM-2003-09-08 (Central & South America)
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