Price-Based Combinatorial Auction: Connectedness and Representative Valuations
AbstractWe investigate combinatorial auctions from a practical perspective. The auctioneer gathers information according to a dynamical protocol termed ask price procedure. We demonstrate a method for elucidating whether a procedure gathers sufficient information for deriving a VCG mechanism. We calculate representative valuation functions in a history-contingent manner, and show that it is necessary and sufficient to examine whether efficient allocations with and without any buyer associated with the profile of representative valuation functions were revealed. This method is tractable, and can be applied to general procedures with connectedness. The representative valuation functions could be the sufficient statistics for privacy preservation.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo in its series CARF F-Series with number CARF-F-261.
Length: 37 pages
Date of creation: Dec 2011
Date of revision:
Other versions of this item:
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2011. "Price-Based Combinatorial Auction: Connectedness and Representative Valuations," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-806, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
- NEP-ALL-2012-01-03 (All new papers)
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