Price-Based Combinatorial Auction Design: Representative Valuations
AbstractWe investigate price-based mechanisms with connectedness in combinatorial auctions, where with restrictions of privacy and complexity, the auctioneer asks a limited number of prices to buyers who provide demand responses. Consistent with the price-based property, several necessary and sufficient conditions are presented for the existence of the VCG mechanism, strategy-proofness with participation constraints, approximate strategy-proofness, Nash equilibrium, efficiency, core, and others. In all cases, the concept of the representative valuation function, which assigns the minimal valuation in both absolute and relative terms to any revealed package, plays the central role in determining whether these conditions are satisfied.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo in its series CIRJE F-Series with number CIRJE-F-776.
Date of creation: Nov 2010
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Other versions of this item:
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2010. "Price-Based Combinatorial Auction Design: Representative Valuations," KIER Working Papers 742, Kyoto University, Institute of Economic Research.
- D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Auctions
- D61 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Allocative Efficiency; Cost-Benefit Analysis
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2010-12-11 (All new papers)
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- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2011.
"Price-Based Combinatorial Auction: Connectedness and Representative Valuations,"
CARF F-Series, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo
CARF-F-261, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2011. "Price-Based Combinatorial Auction: Connectedness and Representative Valuations," CIRJE F-Series, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo CIRJE-F-806, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
- Hitoshi Matsushima, 2010. "Auctioneer's Discretion in Combinatorial Auctions," CARF F-Series, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo CARF-F-293, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo, revised Sep 2012.
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