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Price-Based Combinatorial Auction: Connectedness and Representative Valuations

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  • Hitoshi Matsushima

    (Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo)

Abstract

We investigate combinatorial auctions from a practical perspective. The auctioneer gathers information according to a dynamical protocol termed ask price procedure. We demonstrate a method for elucidating whether a procedure gathers sufficient information for deriving a VCG mechanism. We calculate representative valuation functions in a history-contingent manner, and show that it is necessary and sufficient to examine whether efficient allocations with and without any buyer associated with the profile of representative valuation functions were revealed. This method is tractable, and can be applied to general procedures with connectedness. The representative valuation functions could be the sufficient statistics for privacy preservation.

Suggested Citation

  • Hitoshi Matsushima, 2011. "Price-Based Combinatorial Auction: Connectedness and Representative Valuations," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-806, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
    • Handle: RePEc:tky:fseres:2011cf806
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Hitoshi Matsushima, 2010. "Price-Based Combinatorial Auction Design: Representative Valuations," KIER Working Papers 742, Kyoto University, Institute of Economic Research.
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    1. Matsushima Hitoshi, 2018. "Connected Price Dynamics with Revealed Preferences and Auctioneer’s Discretion in VCG Combinatorial Auction," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 18(1), pages 1-16, January.
    2. Hitoshi Matsushima, 2015. "Connected Price Dynamics with Revealed Preferences and Auctioneer’s Discretionin VCG Combinatorial Auction (Published in the B. E. Journal of Theoretical Economics 18 (1), 2018.)," CARF F-Series CARF-F-359, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo.
    3. Hitoshi Matsushima, 2010. "Auctioneer's Discretion in Combinatorial Auctions," CARF F-Series CARF-F-293, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo, revised Sep 2012.

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