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Price-Based Combinatorial Auction Design: Representative Valuations

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  • Hitoshi Matsushima

    (Department of Economics, University of Tokyo)

Abstract

We investigate price-based mechanisms with connectedness in combinatorial auctions, where with restrictions of privacy and complexity, the auctioneer asks a limited number of prices to buyers who provide demand responses. Consistent with the price-based property, several necessary and sufficient conditions are presented for the existence of the VCG mechanism, strategy-proofness with participation constraints, approximate strategy-proofness, Nash equilibrium, efficiency, core, and others. In all cases, the concept of the representative valuation function, which assigns the minimal valuation in both absolute and relative terms to any revealed package, plays the central role in determining whether these conditions are satisfied.

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File URL: http://www.kier.kyoto-u.ac.jp/DP/DP742.pdf
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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Kyoto University, Institute of Economic Research in its series KIER Working Papers with number 742.

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Length: 40pages
Date of creation: Nov 2010
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:kyo:wpaper:742

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Keywords: Combinatorial Auctions; Price-Based Mechanisms; VCG Mechanisms; Connectedness; Representative Valuation Functions;

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Cited by:
  1. Hitoshi Matsushima, 2011. "Price-Based Combinatorial Auction: Connectedness and Representative Valuations," CARF F-Series, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo CARF-F-261, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo.
  2. Hitoshi Matsushima, 2010. "Auctioneer's Discretion in Combinatorial Auctions," CARF F-Series, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo CARF-F-293, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo, revised Sep 2012.

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