Profit Sharing and Relative Consumption
AbstractTraditionally, it has been argued that profit sharing can increase employment and welfare because it lowers marginal labour costs without reducing total cost or labour income. In this paper, we show that profit sharing can also represent a Pareto-improvement if labour supply is excessive due to relative consumption effects. Mandatory profit sharing reduces wages. If the rise in profit income keeps total income constant, profit sharing will have no income but only a substitution effect. Since labour supply is excessive, profit sharing constitutes a Pareto-improvement.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by CESifo Group Munich in its series CESifo Working Paper Series with number 3970.
Date of creation: 2012
Date of revision:
labour supply; profit sharing; relative consumption; status concerns;
Other versions of this item:
- Laszlo Goerke, 2012. "Profit Sharing and Relative Consumption," IAAEU Discussion Papers 201202, Institute of Labour Law and Industrial Relations in the European Union (IAAEU).
- Goerke, Laszlo, 2012. "Profit Sharing and Relative Consumption," IZA Discussion Papers 6925, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
- Goerke, Laszlo, 2012. "Profit Sharing and Relative Consumption," Annual Conference 2012 (Goettingen): New Approaches and Challenges for the Labor Market of the 21st Century 66064, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
- D62 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Externalities
- J22 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - Time Allocation and Labor Supply
- J33 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Compensation Packages; Payment Methods
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Giacomo Corneo, 2000.
"The Efficient Side of Progressive Income Taxation,"
CESifo Working Paper Series
364, CESifo Group Munich.
- Michaelis, Jochen, 1997. "On the equivalence of profit and revenue sharing," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 57(1), pages 113-118, November.
- Eckalbar, John C., 1988. "Profit sharing in a competitive environment," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 5(4), pages 396-402, October.
- Jackman, Richard, 1988. "Profit-sharing in a unionised economy with imperfect competition," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 6(1), pages 47-57, March.
- Francisco Alvarez-Cuadrado, 2006.
"Envy, Leisure, And Restrictions On Working Hours,"
Departmental Working Papers
2006-01, McGill University, Department of Economics.
- Martin L. Weitzman, 1984.
"The Simple Macroeconomics of Profit Sharing,"
357, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
- Georges, Christophre, 1998. "Profit-Shares, Bargaining, and Unemployment," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 36(2), pages 286-91, April.
- Clark, Andrew E. & Frijters, Paul & Shields, Michael A., 2007.
"Relative Income, Happiness and Utility: An Explanation for the Easterlin Paradox and Other Puzzles,"
IZA Discussion Papers
2840, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
- Andrew E. Clark & Paul Frijters & Michael A. Shields, 2008. "Relative Income, Happiness, and Utility: An Explanation for the Easterlin Paradox and Other Puzzles," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 46(1), pages 95-144, March.
- Lin, Chung-cheng & Chang, Juin-jen & Lai, Ching-chong, 2002. "Profit sharing as a worker discipline device," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 19(5), pages 815-828, November.
- Persson, Mats, 1995. " Why Are Taxes So High in Egalitarian Societies?," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 97(4), pages 569-80, December.
- Bill Dupor & Wen-Fang Liu, 2003. "Jealousy and Equilibrium Overconsumption," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 93(1), pages 423-428, March.
- Jerger, Jurgen & Michaelis, Jochen, 1999. " Profit Sharing, Capital Formation and the NAIRU," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 101(2), pages 257-75, June.
- Laszlo Goerke & Markus Pannenberg, 2012.
"Trade Union Membership and Sickness Absence: Evidence from a Sick Pay Reform,"
IAAEU Discussion Papers
201207, Institute of Labour Law and Industrial Relations in the European Union (IAAEU).
- Goerke, Laszlo & Pannenberg, Markus, 2012. "Trade Union Membership and Sickness Absence: Evidence from a Sick Pay Reform," IZA Discussion Papers 6777, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
- Laszlo Goerke & Markus Pannenberg, 2012. "Trade Union Membership and Sickness Absence: Evidence from a Sick Pay Reform," SOEPpapers on Multidisciplinary Panel Data Research 470, DIW Berlin, The German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP).
- Laszlo Goerke & Markus Pannenberg, 2012. "Trade Union Membership and Sickness Absence: Evidence from a Sick Pay Reform," CESifo Working Paper Series 3909, CESifo Group Munich.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Julio Saavedra).
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.