Genetic Testing and Repulsion from Chance
AbstractA central theme in the international debate on genetic testing concerns the extent to which insurance companies should be allowed to use genetic information in their design of insurance contracts. We analyze this issue within a model with the following important feature: A person’s well-being depends on the perceived probability of becoming ill in the future in a way that varies among individuals. We show that both tested high-risks and untested individuals are equally well off whether or not test results can be used by insurers. Individuals who test for being low-risks, on the other hand, are made worse off by not being able to verify this to insurers. This implies that verifiability dominates nonverifiability in an ex-ante sense.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by CESifo Group Munich in its series CESifo Working Paper Series with number 1181.
Date of creation: 2004
Date of revision:
Other versions of this item:
- Hoel, Michael & Nilssen, Tore & Vislie, Jon & Iversen, Tor, 2009. "Genetic testing and repulsion from chance," HERO On line Working Paper Series, Oslo University, Health Economics Research Programme 2002:10, Oslo University, Health Economics Research Programme.
- Hoel, Michael & Iversen, Tor & Nilssen, Tore & Vislie, Jon, 2003. "Genetic testing and repulsion from chance," Memorandum, Oslo University, Department of Economics 20/2003, Oslo University, Department of Economics.
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- I11 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Analysis of Health Care Markets
- I18 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Government Policy; Regulation; Public Health
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