Breakdown of Will and the Value of Information
AbstractIt is commonly observed that people refuse to obtain more detailed infor- mation about their health status, e. g. by not taking genetic tests, even if this information is costless and only disclosed to the individual. This observation is in contrast to the predictions of expected utility theory. We present a model that accounts for this phenomenon by using time- inconsistent preferences. It is shown that if people devise strategies against their inconsistency, which in line with the literature will be called will, then information about a serious illness might lead to a breakdown of will. In those cases information might have a negative value. We derive some comparative statistics results and provide empirical evidence.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers in its series CEPR Discussion Papers with number 3111.
Date of creation: Dec 2001
Date of revision:
Contact details of provider:
Postal: Centre for Economic Policy Research, 77 Bastwick Street, London EC1V 3PZ.
Phone: 44 - 20 - 7183 8801
Fax: 44 - 20 - 7183 8820
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D80 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - General
- I10 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - General
You can help add them by filling out this form.
CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Hoel, Michael & Nilssen, Tore & Vislie, Jon & Iversen, Tor, 2009.
"Genetic testing and repulsion from chance,"
HERO On line Working Paper Series, Oslo University, Health Economics Research Programme
2002:10, Oslo University, Health Economics Research Programme.
- Hoel, Michael & Iversen, Tor & Nilssen, Tore & Vislie, Jon, 2003. "Genetic testing and repulsion from chance," Memorandum 20/2003, Oslo University, Department of Economics.
- Michael Hoel & Tor Iversen & Tore Nilssen & Jon Vislie, 2004. "Genetic Testing and Repulsion from Chance," CESifo Working Paper Series 1181, CESifo Group Munich.
- Hoel, Michael & Iversen, Tor & Nilssen, Tore & Vislie, Jon, 2006. "Genetic testing in competitive insurance markets with repulsion from chance: A welfare analysis," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 25(5), pages 847-860, September.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: ().
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.