Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this article or follow this journal

Genetic testing with primary prevention and moral hazard

Contents:

Author Info

  • Bardey, David
  • De Donder, Philippe

Abstract

We develop a model where a genetic test reveals whether an individual has a low or high probability of developing a disease. Testing is not mandatory, but agents have to reveal their test results to the insurers, facing a discrimination risk. A costly prevention effort allows agents with a genetic predisposition to decrease their probability to develop the disease. We study the individual decisions to take the test and to undertake the prevention effort as a function of the effort cost and of its efficiency. If effort is observable by insurers, agents undertake the test only if the effort cost is neither too large nor too small. If the effort cost is not observable by insurers, moral hazard increases the value of the test if the effort cost is low. We offer several policy recommendations, from the optimal breadth of the tests to policies to do away with the discrimination risk.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S016762961300057X
Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Health Economics.

Volume (Year): 32 (2013)
Issue (Month): 5 ()
Pages: 768-779

as in new window
Handle: RePEc:eee:jhecon:v:32:y:2013:i:5:p:768-779

Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505560

Related research

Keywords: Discrimination risk; Informational value of test; Personalized medicine;

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. Cochrane, John H, 1995. "Time-Consistent Health Insurance," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 103(3), pages 445-73, June.
  2. Dionne, G. & Eeckhoudt, L., 1984. "Self-Insurance, Self-Protection and Increased Risk Aversion," Cahiers de recherche, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques 8424, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques.
  3. Ray Rees & Patricia Apps, 2006. "Genetic testing, income distribution and insurance markets, CHERE Working Paper 2006/3," Working Papers, CHERE, University of Technology, Sydney 2006/3, CHERE, University of Technology, Sydney.
  4. Shavell, Steven, 1979. "On Moral Hazard and Insurance," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, MIT Press, vol. 93(4), pages 541-62, November.
  5. Tabarrok, Alexander, 1994. "Genetic testing: An economic and contractarian analysis," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 13(1), pages 75-91, March.
  6. Hoel, Michael & Iversen, Tor & Nilssen, Tore & Vislie, Jon, 2006. "Genetic testing in competitive insurance markets with repulsion from chance: A welfare analysis," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 25(5), pages 847-860, September.
  7. Ray REES & Patricia APPS, 2006. "Genetic testing, income distribution and insurance Markets," Annales d'Economie et de Statistique, ENSAE, issue 83-84, pages 353-368.
  8. Francesca Barigozzi & Dominique Henriet, 2011. "Genetic Information: Comparing Alternative Regulatory Approaches When Prevention Matters," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 13(1), pages 23-46, 02.
  9. Michael Hoel & Tor Iversen, 2001. "Genetic Testing When There is a Mix of Compulsory and Voluntary Health Insurance," CESifo Working Paper Series 495, CESifo Group Munich.
  10. Doherty, Neil A. & Thistle, Paul D., 1996. "Adverse selection with endogenous information in insurance markets," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 63(1), pages 83-102, December.
  11. Dhaval Dave & Robert Kaestner, 2006. "Health Insurance and Ex Ante Moral Hazard: Evidence from Medicare," NBER Working Papers 12764, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  12. Lilia Filipova & Michael Hoy, 2009. "Impact of Genetic Testing on Surveillance and Prevention," Working Papers, University of Guelph, Department of Economics and Finance 0904, University of Guelph, Department of Economics and Finance.
  13. Strohmenger, R. & Wambach, A., 2000. "Adverse selection and categorical discrimination in the health insurance markets: the effects of genetic tests," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 19(2), pages 197-218, March.
  14. Bardey, David & Lesur, Romain, 2005. "Optimal health insurance contract: Is a deductible useful?," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 87(3), pages 313-317, June.
  15. Hoy, Michael & Polborn, Mattias, 2000. "The value of genetic information in the life insurance market," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 78(3), pages 235-252, November.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. Simeon Schudy & Verena Utikal, 2012. "The Influence of (Im)perfect Data Privacy on the Acquisition of Personal Health Data," Working Paper Series of the Department of Economics, University of Konstanz 2012-12, Department of Economics, University of Konstanz.
  2. Johan N.M. Lagerlöf & Christoph Schotmüller, 2013. "Monopoly Insurance with Endogenous Information," Discussion Papers 13-15, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics.
  3. Filipova-Neumann, Lilia & Hoy, Michael, 2014. "Managing genetic tests, surveillance, and preventive medicine under a public health insurance system," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 34(C), pages 31-41.
  4. Goulão, Catarina & Thibault, Emmanuel, 2013. "Physical Activity and Policy Recommendations: a Social Multiplier Approach," IDEI Working Papers, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse 782, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:jhecon:v:32:y:2013:i:5:p:768-779. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Zhang, Lei).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.