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Genetic Testing When There is a Mix of Compulsory and Voluntary Health Insurance

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Author Info
Michael Hoel ()
Tor Iversen ()

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Abstract

Genetic insurance can deal with the negative effects of genetic testing on insurance coverage and income distribution when the insurer has access to information about test status. Hence, efficient testing is promoted. When information about prevention and test status is private, two types of social inefficiencies may occur; genetic testing may not be done when it is socially efficient and genetic testing may be done although it is socially inefficient. The first type of inefficiency is shown to be likely for consumers with compulsory insurance only, while the second type of inefficiency is more likely for those who have supplemented the compulsory insurance with substantial voluntary insurance. This second type of inefficiency is more important the less effective prevention is. It is therefore a puzzle that many countries have imposed strict regulation on the genetic information insurers have access to. A reason may be that genetic insurance is not yet a political issue, and the advantage of shared genetic information is therefore not transparent.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by CESifo Group Munich in its series CESifo Working Paper Series with number CESifo Working Paper No. 495.

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Date of creation: 2001
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Handle: RePEc:ces:ceswps:_495

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Related research
Keywords: Genetic testing insurance; private information; compulsory/voluntary mix;

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information
H52 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Government Expenditures and Education
I18 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Government Policy; Regulation; Public Health

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

  1. Besley, Timothy & Hall, John & Preston, Ian, 1998. "Private and public health insurance in the UK," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 42(3-5), pages 491-497, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Strohmenger, R. & Wambach, A., 2000. "Adverse selection and categorical discrimination in the health insurance markets: the effects of genetic tests," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 19(2), pages 197-218, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Hoy, Michael & Polborn, Mattias, 2000. "The value of genetic information in the life insurance market," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 78(3), pages 235-252, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  4. Doherty, Neil A. & Thistle, Paul D., 1996. "Adverse selection with endogenous information in insurance markets," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 63(1), pages 83-102, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Tabarrok, Alexander, 1994. "Genetic testing: An economic and contractarian analysis," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 13(1), pages 75-91, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Hoy, Michael, 1989. "The value of screening mechanisms under alternative insurance possibilities," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 39(2), pages 177-206, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. F. Barigozzi & D. Henriet, 2009. "Genetic Information: Comparing Alternative Regulatory Approaches when Prevention Matters," Working Papers 657, Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Nathalie Fombaron & Carine Milcent, 2007. "The distortionary effect of health insurance on health demand," PSE Working Papers 2007-40, PSE (Ecole normale supérieure). [Downloadable!]
  3. Winand Emons, 2006. "Genetic Tests and Intertemporal Screening in Competitive Insurance Markets," Diskussionsschriften dp0605, Universitaet Bern, Departement Volkswirtschaft. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  4. Hoel, Michael & Nilssen, Tore & Vislie, Jon & Iversen, Tor, 2009. "Genetic testing and repulsion from chance," HERO On line Working Paper Series 2002:10, Oslo University, Health Economics Research Programme. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
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