Information Asymmetry, Share Mispricing and the Coordination Problem: Investor Portfolio Choice in Czech Voucher Privatization
AbstractVoucher privatization in the Czech Republic presented a natural experiment of the ability of investors to construct their portfolios under conditions of asymmetric information and the absence of stock market prices. This paper provides a theoretical model of an optimal portfolio choice made by the investors maximizing their expected return and at the same time solving a coordination problem in a non-cooperative game with other investors. The perception of share misvaluation and private information are endogenized. The model offers an interpretation and theoretical justification of earlier empirical findings and explains the crucial role of the auctioneer, different optimal strategies for different types of investors and the redundancy of legal limits constraining ownership stakes in firms. The results provide implications for the design of voucher privatization, which should lead to more efficient share distribution and price setting.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by The Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education - Economic Institute, Prague in its series CERGE-EI Working Papers with number wp301.
Date of creation: Jul 2006
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Voucher privatization; Asymmetric information; Portfolio and strategic investors; Portfolio choice; Mispricing;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D81 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- G11 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Portfolio Choice; Investment Decisions
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2006-10-07 (All new papers)
- NEP-FIN-2006-10-07 (Finance)
- NEP-FMK-2006-10-07 (Financial Markets)
- NEP-TRA-2006-10-07 (Transition Economics)
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